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Abstract 
A fundamental criterion of patentability is that an invention must be new as compared to the prior art—the 
corpus of preexisting knowledge and technology already available to the public. If an invention is in the 
prior art, or rendered obvious by it, it cannot be patented. 
The U.S. Patent Act has traditionally envisioned a categorical approach for deciding what counts as prior 
art. Under this approach, courts are supposed to decide whether a particular disclosure about the 
invention (a reference) falls within one of the categories listed in Section 102 of the Patent Act, such as 
“described in a printed publication,” “in public use,” or “on sale.” Yet the categorical approach lacks a 
coherent theory of publicness. It is difficult to find guiding principles to explain courts’ decisions about 
what is, or is not, public. For example, a woman wearing a corset invention at home under her clothing 
was deemed to be an invalidating “public use” that barred future patenting; yet an employee liberally 
sharing his invention with others at work was not. 
We argue that, while courts refer to the statutory categories, they are in reality turning to concepts of 
publicness that strikingly resemble those of a different legal regime: trade secret law. Indeed, our review 
of the cases shows that trade secrecy status is dispositive for what counts as prior art in many of the 
leading cases. At a normative level, we argue that trade secrecy provides a surprisingly effective way to 
manage the boundary between legally public and legally secret information, and for deciding whether a 
reference is truly “available to the public” in the ways that matter for patent policy and, indeed, information 
policy more broadly. Not only does the trade secrecy standard protect peoples’ justifiable reliance on 
information that is already available to them, but it simultaneously makes inventors’ paths to patenting 
more efficient. 
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deciding what counts as prior art. Under this approach, courts are supposed to 
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courts’ decisions about what is, or is not, public. For example, a woman wearing 
a corset invention at home under her clothing was deemed to be an invalidating 
“public use” that barred future patenting; yet an employee liberally sharing his 
invention with others at work was not. 
We argue that, while courts refer to the statutory categories, they are in reality 
turning to concepts of publicness that strikingly resemble those of a different legal 
regime: trade secret law. Indeed, our review of the cases shows that trade secrecy 
status is dispositive for what counts as prior art in many of the leading cases. 
At a normative level, we argue that trade secrecy provides a surprisingly effective 
way to manage the boundary between legally public and legally secret 
information, and for deciding whether a reference is truly “available to the 
public” in the ways that matter for patent policy and, indeed, information policy 
more broadly. Not only does the trade secrecy standard protect peoples’ justifiable 
reliance on information that is already available to them, but it simultaneously 
makes inventors’ paths to patenting more efficient. 
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A fundamental question in patent law is whether a claimed invention 
is new as compared to the prior art—the corpus of knowledge and 
technology that is already available to the public.1 If an invention is 
contained in the prior art, or rendered obvious by it, the invention 
cannot be patented.2 The reason is simple. As a matter of policy, we do 
not want to grant exclusive rights in inventions that were already 
invented and available to others, such as competitors and researchers 
                                               
 1. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 
922 (2011) (“Determining novelty requires a comparison of the invention that the 
applicant seeks to patent with the ‘prior art,’ which refers to preexisting knowledge 
and technology already available to the public.”); Timothy Holbrook, Patent Prior Art 
and Possession, 60 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 123, 127 (2018) (defining “prior art” as “the 
set of information generally known to the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in 
the art (PHOSITA)”). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 102; see also Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1253, 1254 (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 103; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 
1, 5–6 (1966). 
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in the field who might wish to use them.3 Doing so would unjustifiably 
deprive people of the right to use inventions and information to which 
they already have access and disrupt the patent bargain by giving the 
patentee an exclusive right without demanding disclosure of anything 
new in return.4 
Under the current regime, determining what counts as prior art 
requires deciding whether a particular disclosure of information about 
the invention—called a reference—falls within one of the formal 
categories of activities listed in Section 102 of the Patent Act.5 These 
statutory categories include disclosures that render the invention 
“patented”; “described in a printed publication”; “in public use”; “on 
sale”; or “otherwise available to the public” prior to the critical date.6 
The cases applying Section 102 are a bit of a mess.7 It is often difficult 
to explain courts’ decisions about what counts as sufficiently public to 
be considered prior art. For example, the Supreme Court found that a 
woman wearing a corset invention under her clothing fell into the 
category of a “public use” that rendered an inventor’s patent invalid.8 So 
did private laboratory use of a centrifuge by a single research scientist.9 
                                               
 3. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) 
(“Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are 
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that 
they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all.”); see also Seymore, supra 
note 1, at 930. 
 4. See, e.g., Michael L. Ryan, Novelty in Patent Law, CORNELL L. SCH. HIST. THESES 
& DISSERTATIONS COLLECTION 3 (1896); see also Comment, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 369, 370 (1959). 
 5. A reference is information about an invention that is potentially going to be 
considered prior art. It can refer to a documentary reference (e.g., a journal article) 
or a nondocumentary reference, such as an activity like a sale or use of the invention. 
See Sean B. Seymore, The “Printed Publication” Bar After Klopfenstein: Has the Federal 
Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 494 
n.6 (2007). 
 6. As we explain in Part I, infra, the critical date for judging novelty depends on 
whether the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), which switched the United States from 
a first-to-invent to a first-to-file rule, applies. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952) (outlining 
novelty requirements for the first-to-invent rule), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) (listing 
novelty requirements for the first-to-file rule). 
 7. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 127 (“Under the Patent Act of 1952, prior art was 
defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102, which was, frankly, a mess. There was no rational structure 
to its provisions; it was merely a codification of previous judicial decisions arbitrarily 
listed in no particular order.”). 
 8. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 338 (1881). 
 9. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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But when an inventor freely shared models of his Rubik’s Cube 
invention with his boss and colleagues at work, the Federal Circuit held 
this was not “public use” sufficient to invalidate the inventor’s later 
patent.10 Meanwhile, a fourteen-slide lecture displayed on a poster for 
three days,11 an article on an obscure website,12 and a thesis buried in 
a library in Germany were all held to constitute “printed publications” 
under Section 102.13 Each were deemed to have entered the prior art 
and to anticipate patents sought for the same inventions—even though 
none of these examples meets the ordinary person’s understanding of 
what publication means.14 
We do not necessarily disagree with the outcomes of these 
decisions.15 Rather, we see them as lacking a consistent theoretical 
basis. Despite Section 102’s categorical approach, it seems clear that 
the decisionmakers in these cases—in particular the Federal Circuit, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases16—are 
seeking to determine whether the reference cited in the case resulted 
in the invention being sufficiently public to matter for patent policy.17 
On one level, this makes sense. Several of the categories of prior art 
listed in Section 102 refer explicitly to the idea of publicness; and, as we 
will show, since 2011, it is even more apparent that courts are supposed 
to be asking whether the reference is “available to the public.”18 
However, so far as we can tell, no one has identified a satisfactory theory 
to explain what it means for a prior art reference to be public. 
In this Article, we argue there is, in fact, a consistent theoretical basis 
underlying courts’ prior art decisions. Namely, courts are using 
concepts of publicness that strikingly resemble those of another legal 
                                               
 10. Moleculon Rsch. Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 11. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 12. Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software, Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 13. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 14. See generally Seymore, supra note 5, at 504–09; see also Stephen Yelderman, Prior 
Art in the District Court, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 862–63 (2019) (“[U]nder the 
Federal Circuit’s Klopfenstein test, printed publication can include things that 
colloquially would not be understood as ‘publications’ at all—such as slide shows, 
poster boards, and handouts displayed or distributed at conferences.” (citing Margo 
A. Bagley, Academic Disclosure and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 
47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221 (2006))). 
 15. But we will raise some doubts about a few of them in Part III, infra. 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1295. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part I. 
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regime: trade secret law. Trade secret law creates a cause of action 
against those who misappropriate information that is kept sufficiently 
secret.19 By necessity, trade secret law developed legal tools to manage 
the boundary between “secret” and “public” information.20 As trade 
secret scholars who have read thousands of trade secret opinions, it is 
clear to us that courts in patent law cases use trade secret law concepts, 
or something very similar to them, to draw the line between public and 
non-public disclosures of information about inventions, even if courts 
do not say so directly.21 
The Article makes two contributions. First, at a descriptive level, we 
show that courts often draw on trade secrecy concepts of publicness 
when assessing patent prior art. Indeed, our review of the major prior 
art cases suggests the trade secrecy status of information is largely 
dispositive. Just like in a trade secrecy analysis, courts assess: first, 
whether a reference has rendered information about the invention 
“generally known” or “readily ascertainable through proper means”; and 
second, whether the information has been the subject of “reasonable 
measures” to maintain its secrecy.22 If either of these aspects of trade 
secrecy fail, courts presume the reference is public and in the prior art. 
But if a reference does qualify as a trade secret, courts tend to consider 
it non-public and not part of the prior art. 
There are important exceptions, which we discuss in detail. But in 
those cases, we argue, courts are guided by considerations other than 
publicness, such as the important policy of preventing inventors from 
commercializing their inventions in secret too long prior to patenting.23 
The existence of these exceptions, and even of some outlier cases, does 
not weaken the explanatory power of the general rule. Unless there is 
some other policy reason separate from information’s publicness that 
                                               
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (Unif. L. Comm’n 
1985). See generally ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, TRADE SECRET LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1–3, 43–46 (3d ed. 2021). 
 20. Cf. Michael J. Madison, Open Secrets, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: 
A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 222, 223–24 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine 
J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (observing that trade secret law supplies a mechanism for 
“managing boundaries between what is legally secret and what is legally public”). 
 21. As we explain in Part III, infra, courts have recognized the rule indirectly in the 
course of carving out a major exception. See, e.g., Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon 
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). Also, the Federal Circuit 
has recognized the similarity in the standards in its trade secret case law. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1. 
 23. See infra Section III.C. 
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mandates treating a reference as prior art, the trade secret status of 
information is determinative. 
The Article’s second contribution is normative. We propose that the 
trade secrecy standard—so long as it is properly applied24—has 
surprising benefits for patent law and policy. There are two main 
reasons for this. First, using trade secrecy to set the standard for 
publicness helps enforce what Robert Merges calls the “nonremoval 
principle” by protecting members of the relevant public from being 
deprived of what is already freely available to them.25 Second, the trade 
secrecy standard helps make inventors’ roads to patenting more efficient. 
For inventor-produced prior art (where the inventor is in control of the 
disclosure), the trade secrecy standard employs an efficient “reasonableness” 
standard for evaluating inventors’ confidentiality precautions and clarifies 
the steps inventors must take to prevent their activities from becoming 
prior art. Finally, with respect to third-party trade secret uses 
(especially those that don’t place the invention on sale), we believe 
that application of the trade secrecy standard for prior art is more 
consistent with the disclosure purposes of patent law.26 
The upshot is that there could be advantages to making the trade 
secret standard more consistent and explicit than it currently is. Rather 
than focusing on fitting a reference into statutory categories that are a 
matter of historical happenstance, courts (and potentially other 
decision makers, like patent examiners27) should focus their efforts on 
deciding whether an identified disclosure of information qualifies as a 
trade secret. After doing so, they can then apply applicable exceptions 
to the general rule that reflect considerations other than publicness.28 
                                               
 24. This caveat is essential. An incorrect application of trade secret law that views 
trade secrecy protection as easier to achieve than it actually is will lead to incorrect 
outcomes and to less information being deemed part of patent prior art. Importantly, 
secrecy alone is not enough. 
 25. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7, 142–43 (2011); see 
also ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
389 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing the anti-backsliding principle). 
 26. As we’ll discuss, some case law gets this wrong, treating trade secret uses by 
third parties as prior art. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); see also infra text accompanying notes 313–24. 
 27. When conducting an evaluation of prior art, patent examiners do not often 
assess more than patents and information found in printed publications that are 
available to them. But to the extent issues of publicness arise at the patent office, 
examiners could draw on a trade secrecy standard as well. We discuss caveats to this in 
note 79, infra. 
 28. See infra Section III.C. 
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Our proposal for a trade secrecy standard for prior art is especially 
timely for two reasons. First, the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) 
made several amendments to Section 102 that make the trade secrecy 
standard particularly well-suited to applying these amendments. Most 
obviously, the AIA reveals that the best way to interpret the new 
language, “otherwise available to the public,” is as a new, sui generis 
category of prior art that encompasses new forms of disclosures that 
don’t qualify as trade secrets.29 
Second, trade secret and patent law are both legal regimes with the 
purpose of promoting invention and innovation.30 The trade secrecy 
standard is particularly compelling now that both patent law and trade 
secret law are federal legal regimes.31 Thus, it makes sense that the 
trade secret status of an informational disclosure under Title 18 of the 
U.S. Code, where trade secret law is housed, would inform its patent 
prior art status under Title 35, where patent law is housed. Indeed, 
even prior to passage of a federal trade secret law, the U.S. Supreme 
Court indicated in Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp. that trade secret law 
should be informed by patent policies—in particular, by patent law’s 
“policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in the 
public domain.”32 
This Article provides the framework and justifications for bringing 
trade secret principles to bear on the patent prior art analysis.33 Part I 
explains the basic patent prior art categories and the relevant changes 
wrought by the AIA. Part II argues that, at a high level of abstraction, 
Section 102 mandates that decisionmakers should use public availability 
as the touchstone for identifying prior art. Part III introduces the trade 
secrecy standard for patent prior art by showing how the requirements 
of trade secrecy match up with the categories of patent prior art. It 
                                               
 29. See infra Part IV.D. 
 30. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1973). See generally Mark 
A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
311 (2007). 
 31. Trade secret law in the United States was only state law until recently. On May 
11, 2016, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), transforming trade 
secret law from a state law regime to a parallel state and federal regime. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1831, 1832; see also infra Part II. 
 32. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (“[T]he [patent] policy that matter once in the public 
domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of trade 
secret protection. By definition a trade secret has not been placed in the public domain.”). 
 33. See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 193 (“Patent law could likely be better informed 
by a greater engagement with the law of trade secrecy in this regard.”). 
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demonstrates that courts have been applying the trade secrecy standard, 
or something very similar to it, in many of the major prior art cases. It also 
addresses some of the important exceptions to this general rule. Part IV 
identifies the normative benefits of adopting a trade secrecy standard for 
prior art. The Article concludes by summarizing key concepts and by 
promoting more explicit adoption of the trade secrecy standard. 
I. SECTION 102 PRIOR ART AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
It is not possible to understand the trade secrecy standard for patent 
prior art without understanding the details of the current categorical 
approach to prior art—and the developments underway that support 
turning away from it. So, we start with an explanation. 
In the United States, the principle criterion for patentability is that 
an invention must be new to be patentable.34 The novelty requirement, 
codified in Section 102 of the Patent Act, ensures that an inventor will 
not be given a twenty-year exclusive right35 for an invention to which 
the public already has access.36 The nonobviousness requirement, 
codified in Section 103, creates an additional hurdle and is commonly 
justified as reserving patent protection for inventions that would not 
be invented without the incentive of a patent.37 
These two requirements work in tandem with one another. Lack of 
novelty won’t bar or invalidate a patent unless every element of the 
claimed invention is contained in a single prior art reference.38 But 
nonobviousness will, so long as all elements of the claimed invention 
would be obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art” 
(“PHOSITA”) based on the prior art as a whole.39 
The first step in determining novelty, and eventually nonobviousness,40 
is to decide which disclosures of the claimed invention, or of information 
                                               
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 35. § 154(a) (noting that the current term length of a patent is twenty years). 
 36. § 102; see also § 101 (providing patent protection to anyone who invents or 
discovers a “new” invention). 
 37. § 103; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 38. Seymore, supra note 1, at 931 (“Anticipation requires, first, strict identity 
between the previously disclosed and the now-claimed subject matter; and, second, an 
enabling disclosure.”). 
 39. § 103. 
 40. In general, the same prior art will be used for the Section 103 nonobvious 
analysis and the Section 102 novelty analysis, except that the obviousness inquiry 
permits combining different references and, consequently, there are some differences 
in the universe of relevant prior art. For instance, the “analogous arts” doctrine only 
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related to the claimed invention, count as prior art under Section 
102.41 To constitute Section 102 prior art, the disclosure (a reference) 
must: (1) be dated prior to the applicable critical date (either 
invention or filing date, depending on when the patent was filed, as 
discussed below); (2) enable every element of the claimed invention 
so that others can practice it42; and, most importantly for present 
purposes, (3) be sufficiently public to fall within one of Section 102’s 
delineated categories as defined by prior art jurisprudence.43 
Under the first Patent Act of 1790, there was just one category of 
patent prior art: the invention had to be “known or used” prior to the 
invention date.44 Over the years, the categories of prior art ballooned, 
but unfortunately not in a coherent way.45 Making things more 
complicated, the patent system currently has two distinct sets of 
categories of prior art, depending on when the patent was filed. 
A. 1952 Patent Act Prior Art Categories 
If a patent was filed before March 16, 2013, the old “pre-AIA” 
categories of prior art delineated in the Patent Act of 1952 (the “1952 
Act”) apply. The types of references that count as prior art are 
contained in Section 102(a), the novelty provision, and in Section 
102(b), the statutory bar provision. 
1.  Section 102(a) novelty categories 
Section 102(a) states that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless . . . the invention was known or used by others in this country, 
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.”46 
                                               
allows combining prior art within the same field of endeavor as the invention, or prior 
art related to the problem the invention seeks to solve. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 41. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 134 (“Defining what constitutes ‘prior art’ is a 
critical aspect of the gatekeeping function performed by the USPTO and the federal 
courts, ensuring that patents are awarded for only merit-worthy inventions.”). 
 42. This means satisfying both “strict identity” and “anticipatory enablement.” 
Seymore, supra note 1, at 923, 933. The reference must, to some degree, enable every 
element of the claimed subject matter such that a PHOSITA could make and use it. 
Id. at 923. 
 43. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 403–32, 529–52; CRAIG NARD, 
THE LAW OF PATENTS 280–81 (3d ed. 2014). 
 44. See Patent Act of 1790, ch.7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (repealed 1793). 
 45. See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 127. 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1952). 
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Pursuant to this text, Section 102(a) references fall into three 
categories: the invention was “known or used by others” in the United 
States, or “patented” or “described in a printed publication” anywhere, 
before the invention date.47 
Section 102(a) prior art can only include references that come out 
prior to the inventor’s invention date.48 This is because the first-to-
invent rule focuses on who was first to invent, not just about whether 
the invention was already previously publicly available.49 Patentees can 
thus “swear behind” Section 102(a) prior art that comes out before 
they file the patent by proving an earlier invention date.50 
2. Section 102(b) statutory bar categories 
Section 102(b), called the statutory bar, provides that, even if the 
invention is otherwise novel as of the invention date, a patent will still 
not be allowed if “the invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in 
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States.”51 
Pursuant to this text, Section 102(b) statutory bar prior art includes 
four categories of activity: the invention was “patented” anywhere; 
“described in a printed publication” anywhere; “in public use” in the 
United States; or “on sale” in the United States more than one year 
prior to the filing date.52 
Unlike Section 102(a) novelty prior art, Section 102(b) statutory 
prior art can also include references dated after the invention date, so 
long as they fall more than one year prior to the patent filing date.53 
This is because the statutory bar’s primary purpose was to ensure that 
an inventor couldn’t get a patent for an invention by swearing behind her 
invention date in situations where intervening events—including the 
inventor’s own activities, as well as third parties’—made the invention 
                                               
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see also § 103 (obviousness judged at time of invention). 
 49. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents 
Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 523–26 (2013). 
 50. Id. at 529–30. 
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952). 
 52. Id. Note that earlier versions of this bar set a two-year deadline, which is why 
Egbert v. Lippmann, for instance, used a two-year measure. 104 U.S. 333, 338 (1881). 
 53. § 102(b). 
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available to the public by the time of patenting.54 The effect of the bar 
under the 1952 Act is that inventors have a one-year grace period, after 
the statutory bar is triggered, in which to file a patent application. 
The graphic below provides a timeline for helping the reader 
conceptualize pre-AIA prior art categories. 
 
B. America Invents Act Prior Art Categories 
The AIA categories apply to patent applications filed after March 16, 
2013. Significantly, the AIA switched the critical date for judging 
novelty and nonobviousness to the date the subject patent application 
was filed55 and eliminated the first-to-invent rule.56 Under the AIA, any 
prior art, including inventor or third-party prior art, that existed before 
the filing date will count, so long as it falls into the AIA Section 
102(a)(1) categories. 
1.  Section 102(a)(1) novelty provision categories 
Even though it covers a longer temporal range, the AIA Section 
102(a)(1) categories largely track the pre-AIA categories. Indeed, the AIA 
simply merged the categories in the old novelty provision of Section 102(a) 
and the old statutory bar of Section 102(b) into a single provision—the all-
                                               
 54. The Supreme Court first identified this problem in 1829, which led Congress 
to codify a precursor to the 1952 Act statutory bar. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19–
20 (1829), discussed in Part III, infra. 
 55. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); see § 103 (obviousness now judged as of filing date). 
 56. The exceptions are: (1) derivation, which is where another person claims she 
invented what an inventor claims in a patent derivation proceeding; and (2) what can 
be thought of as a “saving disclosure” under Section 102(b)’s new grace period. 
§§ 102(b), 135(a)(1); see also Merges, supra note 25, at 5. 
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encompassing AIA Section 102(a)(1). It states that: “[a] person shall 
be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, 
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise 
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.”57 Thus, there are now five categories of prior art listed. 
Note that Section 102(a)(1) has no territorial restriction anymore—
each of the forms of prior art can emerge anywhere in the world.58 
Note too that the AIA removed the old Section 102(a) “known or used 
by others” in the United States category, but added a new catchall 
category, “otherwise available to the public,” which arguably captures, 
among other things, the old “known or used” concept. 
2. Section 102(b) grace period 
The AIA’s change to a first-to-file system eliminates the need for a 
separate statutory bar to capture disclosures between the invention 
date and the filing date because patentees can no longer swear behind 
prior art by proving an earlier invention date.59 Nonetheless, AIA 
Section 102(b) replicates some of the effects of the old § 102(b) grace 
period by excluding at least some inventor-generated prior art that is 
generated within a year prior to filing. For example, a disclosure “made 
by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the 
subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a 
joint inventor” is exempted if it is generated within a year before the 
filing date.60 
The graphic below provides a timeline for conceptualizing the AIA 
categories of prior art. 
                                               
 57. § 102(a)(1). Section 102(a)(2) covers prior issued patents and prior filed 
patent applications, to ensure the true first filer gets the patent. § 102(a)(2). 
 58. See CRAIG NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 279–80 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the 
AIA’s elimination of territorial restrictions on prior art); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, 
What Counts as Extraterritorial in Patent Law?, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 291, 321–22 
(2019) (discussing choice of law issues created by expanding the on-sale bar to other 
countries). 
 59. Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1023, 1038 (2012). 
 60. § 102(b)(1). 
1282 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1269 
 
 
II. EMBRACING THE “AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC” BENCHMARK 
The categorical approach to prior art depicted above forces courts 
to fit a given piece of prior art into somewhat arbitrary statutory 
categories. But disclosures of information can take innumerable forms, 
ranging from dissemination in books to use of an invention in a facility 
without sufficient security.61 What matters at the end of the day is not 
what form the reference takes—whether it qualifies specifically as a 
“printed publication,” a “public use,” or an “on sale” event. Rather, the 
critical question is whether the disclosure is sufficiently public to matter 
for patent policy. 
The primary policy consideration underlying Section 102 and the 
novelty rules is protecting public access to information that is already 
publicly available.62 This is a species of what Robert Merges calls the 
nonremoval principle, which holds that no patents shall be granted “for 
anything that was previously available in any publicly accessible form.”63 
It is crucial to note that nonremoval has not historically been the 
only concern underlying what counts as prior art. Other policies may 
come into play that have nothing to do with whether the invention is 
                                               
 61. See cases discussed in Part 0, infra. 
 62. See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 632 
(2019) (“One such condition is the [Section 102] on-sale bar, which reflects Congress’ 
‘reluctance to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use’ by 
obtaining a patent covering that knowledge.” (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 
U.S. 55, 64 (1998))). 
 63. See MERGES, supra note 25, at 6, 142–43. 
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publicly available. These include respect for first inventorship,64 
ensuring prompt filing of patents,65 allowing inventors to conduct 
necessary experiments prior to filing patents,66 and enforcing the rule that 
inventors are not supposed to commercialize their inventions for too long 
prior to patenting.67 These considerations give rise to exceptions, where 
publicness is not necessarily dispositive for identifying prior art.68 
But nonetheless, courts and commentators have often stated that the 
main purpose of Section 102 is to ensure the invention is not already 
“available to the public.”69 In other words, the question is not whether 
a reference fit within a particular categorical form; it is whether the 
reference resulted in the invention being sufficiently public to matter 
for patent policy.70 
Post-AIA, public availability is even more central to how Section 102 
works. The main reason is that first-to-file is the basis for priority rather 
than first-to-invent. This means patentees can’t swear behind prior art 
once it becomes public by proving an earlier invention date; public 
                                               
 64. The question of who came first was very important pre-AIA, see § 102(g) 
(2006) (pre-AIA), but is obviously less so post-AIA. See, e.g., Abrams & Wagner, supra 
note 49, at 519–20. 
 65. See, e.g., Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“The [Section 102(b)] public use bar serves the policies of the patent system, for it 
encourages prompt filing of patent applications after inventions have been completed . . . .” 
(quoting Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (1995))). 
 66. Inventors are permitted to engage in “experimental use” of inventions before 
patenting, even if that experimental use necessarily makes the invention wholly public. 
See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 129 (1877). 
 67. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff, the Federal Circuit used to 
balance four different policy considerations, only one of which was the removal of 
something from the public. See Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 
1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 68. See infra Part III.C. 
 69. See MERGES, supra note 25, at 6, 142–43. 
 70. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 
226 (C.C.P.A. 1981); UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 
1987), overruled on other grounds by Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998), as 
recognized in Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree 
Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Holbrook, supra note 1, at 
147 (“The lodestar [in prior art determinations] has been public accessibility, such 
that the public must have been able to find the art generally, even if finding it would 
be difficult.”); Seymore, supra note 5, at 504 (“‘[P]rinted publication’ has been 
interpreted to mean . . . sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art; 
dissemination and public accessibility are the keys to the legal determination whether 
a prior art reference was ‘published.’”). 
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availability wins the day.71 Congress explicitly recognizes this feature of 
the AIA by newly providing that any disclosure of information that 
makes the invention “otherwise available to the public” can count as 
prior art, regardless of the specific form it takes.72 While the precise 
meaning of Section 102’s new phrase, “available to the public,” has 
been the subject of considerable debate,73 few would argue with the 
proposition that public availability matters for deciding whether 
something is in the prior art, or with the patent system’s underlying 
policy of nonremoval: once it’s public, “thou shalt not take it away.”74 
The upshot, for our purposes, is that the categorical approach to 
prior art may be waning. Rather than attempting to fit square pegs into 
round holes, the ultimate question for the decisionmaker should be 
whether a putative prior art reference was sufficiently public. Indeed, 
even the notoriously formulaic U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has 
made statements to this effect, instructing patent examiners to “focus 
on whether the disclosure was ‘available to the public,’ rather than on 
the means by which the claimed invention became available to the 
public.”75 
This evolving approach to prior art creates an opportunity for courts 
and other decisionmakers76 to turn to trade secret law as the baseline 
for what public availability means. 
                                               
 71. See MERGES, supra note 25, at 5. 
 72. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 73. See infra Section IV.C. 
 74. There is plentiful support for this proposition from a variety of actors in the 
patent system. The Federal Circuit, for example, has stated that it is a: 
[B]asic principle . . . that no patent should be granted which withdraws from the public 
domain technology already available to the public . . . . That is the real meaning of “prior 
art” in legal theory . . . . Society, speaking through Congress and the courts, has said 
“thou shalt not take it away.” 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 75. Despite its back-and-forth on how to interpret post-AIA Section 102, see supra 
Part IV, this guidance comes from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure. MPEP § 2152 (9th ed. Rev., June 2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2152.html. 
 76. We recognize that patent examiners, more so than courts, may benefit from 
being able to quickly place a proffered reference into a formal category, as an initial 
matter. Examiners have to deal with voluminous amounts of information and are 
generally under time pressure. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499–1500 (2001) (discussing the cost and time required 
to examine a patent); Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925, 964–65 (2018) 
(same); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent 
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III. THE TRADE SECRECY STANDARD FOR PRIOR ART 
Grand principles like “available to the public” sound good. But what 
does it really mean for information to be public? When does an act of 
“disclosing” information make the information sufficiently public that 
patent law cannot ignore it? On the surface, these are difficult 
questions, but questions that we believe are and should be informed 
by trade secret law as expressed in the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
(DTSA) and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).77 
Standard definitions of the terms “publication” and “public” equate 
publicness with deliberate, widespread dissemination of information 
in a way that makes the information accessible to all members of a 
community.78 But this is not the way courts think of publicness in prior 
art jurisprudence. Indeed, courts have used the precise phrase, “available 
to the public,” to describe the effect of disclosures of information that, 
frankly, do not seem very public at all.79 This is because of important policy 
choices. 
In this Part, we draw on trade secrecy concepts to explain these 
policy choices. The result is a definition of publicness that is different 
and more encompassing than traditional definitions of publicness. We 
also demonstrate that the trade secrecy concept of publicness appears 
to control in patent prior art cases as well. 
                                               
Office, 72. VAND. L. REV. 975, 978–79 (2019) (same); Shine Tu, Patenting Fast and Slow: 
Examiner Rejections and Applicant Traversals to Non-Prior Art Rejections, W. VA. COLL. L. 
RSCH. PAPER SERIES NO. 2020-005 1 (Mar. 1, 2020). 
 77. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 to 1839); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (Unif. 
L. Comm’n 1985). 
 78. For example, Merriam-Webster defines “public” as meaning, among other 
things, “exposed to general view” or “accessible to or shared by all members of the 
community.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2021). It defines to “publish” as meaning, among other things, “to 
make generally known,” “to disseminate to the public,” or “to produce or release for 
distribution.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2021); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, Disclosure, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON INFORMATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Sandeen, S., Rademacher, C. Ohly, eds.) 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK) (forthcoming); Sharon K. Sandeen, 
Disclosure, Publication, and the Public Domain, AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 79. Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 1119, 1128 (2015). 
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A. The Trade Secrecy Standard for Publicness 
Trade secret law in the United States has evolved for over 180 years 
and was substantially refined in 1979 with adoption of the UTSA and 
its multi-part definition of a trade secret.80 In 2016, Congress borrowed 
the UTSA’s definition of a trade secret when it enacted the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 and for the first time created a parallel 
federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.81 
The DTSA (and the UTSA) defines a trade secret as: (1) information 
that (2) “derives independent economic value, actual or potential,” (3) 
“from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic 
value from the disclosure or use of the information”; and (4) is information 
“the owner . . . has taken reasonable measures to keep . . . secret.”82 
Trade secret law does not create exclusive rights against the world. 
Instead, it creates a private cause of action against one who has 
engaged in trade secret “misappropriation.”83 Misappropriation 
encompasses primarily the wrongful acquisition, disclosure, or use of 
another’s trade secrets.84 This typically occurs when a person in lawful 
possession of the secret, such as an employee, discloses or uses the 
secret in violation of a duty of confidentiality or when someone 
acquires the secret by “improper means.”85 
But our focus isn’t on the intricacies of a trade secret cause of action. 
Rather, it is on trade secret law’s unique definitions of secrecy and 
publicness. Built into the definition of a trade secret is a relatively clear 
standard for what it means for information to be legally secret, on the 
one hand, or legally public, on the other. 
This mechanism requires assessing two closely related issues. The 
first issue is whether the information is sufficiently secret—namely, 
                                               
 80. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit 
Error when They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 523 
(2010). 
 81. The DTSA does not preempt state law claims, meaning a plaintiff can assert 
both simultaneously. 18 U.S.C. § 1838; see also Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. 
Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 
845 (2017). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). The principal difference between the DTSA and the UTSA 
language with respect to secrecy is that the UTSA uses the phrase “other persons” instead 
of “another person.” Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1985). 
 83. ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 19, at 253–54. 
 84. Id. (explaining various pathways for proving misappropriation). 
 85. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836(b), 1839(5),(6). 
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whether it is “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” using proper 
means. The second issue is whether the putative owner of a trade secret 
(or the entity in lawful possession of it86) has taken reasonable 
measures to maintain the information’s secrecy. If either of these 
prongs fails, then the information is deemed public for purposes of 
trade secret law and thus not protectable.87 
1. Not generally known or readily ascertainable 
The first prong of trade secret law’s secrecy versus public divide is 
whether the information has become “generally known” or “readily 
ascertainable through proper means” to “another person” who can 
obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.88 
The “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” concept provides a 
baseline for assessing information’s publicness. If a disclosure, such as a 
publication in a prior patent, has rendered information “generally known” 
or “readily ascertainable,” it is deemed public and not protectable.89 
Deciding what is “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” for trade 
secrecy purposes requires a court to engage in a process that “is similar to 
a ‘prior art’ search under patent law.”90 The court has to compare the 
alleged trade secrets with what was already known to others in the 
“applicable industry.”91 We will return to this analogy momentarily 
                                               
 86. The entity seeking to protect the information need not be the technical owner; 
it can be others in possession of the secret, such as a licensee. See § 1839(4); see also 
State ex rel. Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio Env’t Prot. Agency, 724 N.E.2d 411, 
419 (Ohio 2000) (per curiam). 
 87. Our framing of the trade secrecy standard for prior art deals only with the 
question of publicness or secrecy of information—it does not require assessment of 
the “economic value” of the information, which is a critical issue in trade secret cases. 
This is important because, as we’ll discuss in Part IV, if an inventor is deriving 
economic value from her invention, a separate doctrine that bars patentability 
regardless of secrecy may be triggered. On economic value, see Camilla A. Hrdy & 
Mark A. Lemley, Abandoning Trade Secrets, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); see, e.g., T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey 
Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (“The word ‘secret’ implies 
that the information is not generally known or readily available.”). 
 89. This can happen as early as the motion to dismiss stage of litigation. See William 
Lynch Schaller, On Equipoise, Knowledge, and Speculation: A Unified Theory of Pleading 
Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act—Jurisdiction, Identification, Misappropriation, and 
Inevitable Disclosure, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 168–69 (2020) (explaining that courts 
will dismiss at the 12(b)(6) stage trade secret claims where the allegedly “secret” 
information is shown to be “in the public domain”). 
 90. See ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 19, at 93–94.  
 91. Id. 
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when we discuss patent law’s “printed publication” cases, but first we need 
to unpack trade secrecy’s “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” 
concepts. They are slightly different and have to be assessed separately. 
a. “Generally known” 
The concept of “generally known” is closer to the common 
understanding of what it means for information to be made public—
namely, that it has to be widely disseminated. Thus, for example, if a 
trade secret has been fully disclosed in a United States patent or a 
universally accessible website, it will be deemed generally known and 
not protectable.92 
Importantly, information can be deemed “generally known” even if 
it is not disclosed to members of the general public, so long as the 
information has become known to others, including experts in the 
field as well as potential competitors, who might realistically want to 
access the information and derive value from it.93 So, for example, the fact 
that a novice or lay person does not know the information doesn’t 
necessarily mean it is not “generally known” for trade secret law purposes.94 
b. “Readily ascertainable” 
The “readily ascertainable” concept creates an additional hurdle. It 
extends trade secret law’s baseline for publicness significantly beyond 
the common understanding. 
Under the DTSA and most state trade secret laws, information is 
treated as public and not protectable if it is “readily ascertainable” 
through the use of “proper means.”95 “Proper means” is itself a term of 
art, encompassing methods such as working backwards from public 
sources or developing independently—anything that isn’t considered 
“improper means,” like espionage, trespass, or bribing an insider to 
reveal the information.96 
                                               
 92. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.03 (2020). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); MILGRIM, supra note 92, § 1.03; see also, e.g., Hayden’s Sport 
Ctr., Inc. v. Johnson, 441 N.E.2d 927, 933 (1982) (suggesting that the audience that 
matters for assessing secrecy in trade secret cases is “the general public,” as well as 
“plaintiff’s competitors”). 
 94. See, e.g., Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 20–22 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (discussing what qualifies as “generally known” under the California UTSA). 
 95. The DTSA adopts the additional “readily ascertainable” language, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3), though not all states do. Cf. Cal. Civ. Code. § 3426.1(d) (West 2012). 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
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The general rule is that information is “readily ascertainable” (even 
if not generally known) so long as a person in the relevant field could 
discern it using “reasonable effort” and utilizing only legal means.97 For 
example, information might be deemed “readily ascertainable” if it 
could be found in trade journals or reference books, even if it is not 
clear people have actually accessed them, because they could potentially 
do so without too much effort.98 
2. Reasonable measures to maintain secrecy 
Information often fails the test of trade secrecy because it is generally 
known or readily ascertainable, but if it passes that test, that is not the 
end of the inquiry. To be legally secret for trade secret law purposes, 
information also has to be deliberately kept that way by the entity 
claiming rights in the information. For our purposes, the entity seeking 
to protect the information need not be the technical owner or even 
the entity that developed the information—it can be a licensee or 
potentially even a third party in possession of the secret.99 
To quote the DTSA, the purported owner or possessor of the 
information must take “reasonable measures to keep [the] information 
secret.”100 Thus, if the owner of the trade secret, or the person claiming 
rights to the information, “failed to take affirmative steps to protect the 
secrecy of the [information],” then it will be deemed legally public for 
purposes of trade secret law and not amenable to trade secret protection 
even if it is not generally known or readily ascertainable.101 
There are several rationales for the reasonable measures 
requirement.102 First, requiring efforts to maintain secrecy helps prove the 
                                               
 97. Flotec, Inc. v. S. Rsch., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
 98. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1986) (“Information is 
readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference books, or published 
materials.”); see also Art & Cook, Inc. v. Haber, 416 F. Supp. 3d 191, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 99. See, e.g., Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, 958 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(affirming rule). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A). Under the UTSA, this requirement is referred to as 
the “reasonable efforts” requirement. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. We use the 
“reasonable measures” language of the federal DTSA, but we view these terms as 
synonymous, as did Congress. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 2. 
 101. MILGRIM, supra note 92, § 1.03. 
 102. Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy 
Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 46, 49–50, 59–60 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 
2011); Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68 HASTINGS 
L.J. 357, 362 (2017). 
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trade secret is in fact secret and that it has economic value to the 
owner.103 Second, requiring efforts to maintain secrecy ideally places 
others on “notice” of the information’s intended confidentiality.104 As 
Roger Milgrim puts it, the notice provided by the owner’s secrecy 
precautions, such as a confidentiality ledger or a non-disclosure 
agreement, prevents others—including employees, licensees, contractors, 
or third-party passersby—from being unfairly “lull[ed] . . . into believing 
that the information would not be subject to an assertion of trade 
secret protection.”105 Notice protects others from unfairly relying on 
information they receive and believing it is free to use and disclose. 
After all, one cannot be expected to keep in confidence what one does 
not know is intended to be kept confidential.106 
There is no bright-line rule for what constitutes “reasonable” 
measures to preserve information’s secrecy because it depends upon 
the circumstances of each case. As one court put it: 
The question of whether, in a specific case, a party has made 
reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of a purported trade secret 
is by nature a highly fact-specific inquiry. What may be adequate under 
the peculiar facts of one case might be considered inadequate under 
the facts of another.107 
For example, in some contexts, sharing extensive amounts of 
information with employees, and even with outsiders, can be 
acceptable—so long as this sharing is essential to how the business 
operates and the company takes appropriate steps like making it clear 
the disclosure is intended to be confidential and placing the recipient 
under a legal duty not to further share the information.108 
Although courts typically prefer that companies use explicit 
confidentiality contracts to protect their alleged trade secrets,109 unstated 
                                               
 103. MILGRIM, supra note 92, § 1.04 (noting that secrecy measures may provide 
indirect evidence of actual secrecy). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept 
“Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy”, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 328–29 (1989). 
 107. Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1050 (Conn. 1999) (citation 
omitted). See generally Slaby, supra note 106, at 325. 
 108. Slaby, supra note 106, at 329–30 (discussing application of “reasonable efforts” 
requirement for disclosures to third parties). 
 109. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 80–83 (2011) (showing that courts often assess whether a 
plaintiff used a confidentiality contract). 
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assumptions about what is appropriate in the industry and context 
matter. For example, in a recent case, a U.S. district court held that a 
company’s failure to force a former employee to return her electronic 
devices when she left her job did not demonstrate inadequate secrecy 
precautions on summary judgment, given that the employee had an 
implicit “responsibility not to use or disclose any of [the company’s 
confidential] information.”110 The one thing that seems relatively 
certain is that doing absolutely nothing is insufficient.111 
B. The Trade Secrecy Standard at Work in Prior Art Case Law 
In patent law, the trade secrecy status of prior art, or something close 
to it, has been supplying the rule for what it means for a reference to 
be “available to the public” since at least the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, our review of the patent prior art case law shows the trade 
secrecy status of information is largely dispositive for deciding what 
counts as prior art under Section 102 of the Patent Act (both pre- and 
post-AIA). 
We are not the first commentators to observe this symmetry in the 
development of patent prior art and trade secret law jurisprudence.112 
Nor are we the first to advocate for the potential utility of trade secrecy 
concepts for patent law doctrine, generally.113 But so far as we know, 
we are the first to fully flesh out this symmetry in the case law and to 
explain its normative advantages. 
What follows gives only an overview of the prior art case law, ranging 
from classic and oft-cited cases to more contemporary decisions of the 
Federal Circuit. However—with the exception of the jurisprudence 
concerning inventors’ (and occasionally third parties’) commercial use 
in secret—most of the prior art case decisions that we reviewed can be 
explained by application of the trade secrecy standard of publicness. 
                                               
 110. Vendavo, Inc. v. Long, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1138–39 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 111. Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Vt. 2001) (“Because plaintiff has adduced 
no evidence that he took reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the customer 
information, we hold, as a matter of law, that this customer list is not a trade secret.”). 
 112. See generally Risdale Ellis, Subsequent Inventor’s Patent Rights with Regard to an 
Invention Previously Made by Another Who Kept It Secret, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 259 (1953). 
See also, e.g., Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1959); Merges, 
supra note 59, at 1037 n.38; Lemley, supra note 79, at 1126. 
 113. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 1, at 193 (“Patent law could likely be better 
informed by a greater engagement with the law of trade secrecy in this regard.”); Jonas 
Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 921 (2011) (arguing that “trade 
secrets and patents should be viewed . . . as complementary tools for policy makers”). 
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1. The “printed publication” case law 
“Printed publication” is one of the categories of prior art specified 
in Section 102 of the Patent Act.114 Based upon the statutory language, 
one might think courts would interpret the phrase in line with a 
traditional definition of what it means to “publish” something.115 We 
could envision, for instance, a strict definition, requiring distribution 
of physical copies that have been received by multiple people or at least 
indexed in a public place.116 But the courts have given “printed publication” 
a more expansive meaning that we argue is consistent with trade secret law’s 
concepts of “generally known” and “readily ascertainable.” 
As Sean Seymore has observed, the Federal Circuit has refused to 
“subordinate substance to form” in the “printed publication” 
analysis.117 Instead, courts ask whether the reference is “accessib[le] to 
the interested public,”118 and, more specifically, whether it has been 
“disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons 
interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising 
reasonable diligence, can locate it.”119 Importantly, as this quote shows, 
“publicness” for purposes of the printed publication bar is generally 
measured from the perspective of the “person having ordinary skill in the 
art” (“PHOSITA“).120 The PHOSITA’s knowledge level is determined by 
a variety of factors, but she is generally charged with knowing sources that 
are available to members of the general public, as well as sources available 
only to experts in the field.121 The PHOSITA, as Sean Seymore writes, 
is a “lens” through which the court “views the prior art and the claimed 
invention.”122 
Patent law’s touchstone of “accessibility” to the “person interested in 
the art,” is directly analogous to trade secret law’s rule that information 
                                               
 114. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). 
 115. “The roots of publish and publication both arise from the Latin publicare and 
publicatio, ‘to make public property, to place at the disposal of the community, to make 
public, to make generally known, to exhibit publicly, to publish a book, to confiscate.’” 
Sean M. O’Connor, Distinguishing Different Kinds of Property in Patents and Copyrights, 27 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 205, 206 n.1 (2019). 
 116. Cf. Seymore, supra note 5, at 504–06. 
 117. Id. at 504, 508–09. 
 118. Id. at 496. 
 119. Id. at 496 n.24 (quoting Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 120. We discuss this issue further in Part IV. 
 121. Seymore, supra note 5, at 512–13. 
 122. Id. at 513. 
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loses its status as a trade secret once it has become generally known or 
readily ascertainable using proper means to another person who could 
obtain economic value from disclosure or use of the information.123 
Indeed, because the two standards are very similar, they typically reach 
the same outcomes. 
Not surprisingly, both patent prior art jurisprudence and trade 
secret law consider traditional forms of disclosures and publications, 
such as U.S. patents, legally public.124 The Federal Circuit itself has 
observed this analogy, citing to its patent prior art case law in a recent 
trade secret decision. The court held that an alleged trade secret was 
legally public, and not protectable under state trade secret law, because 
it had already been disclosed in a foreign patent.125 
The harder “printed publication” cases provide a still more 
compelling illustration for the analogy to trade secret law. One of the 
most oft-cited examples is the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Hall,126 
where a single doctoral dissertation in a library in Germany—which 
had not yet been indexed and had only recently been catalogued—
counted as a “printed publication” that barred a subsequent patent for the 
same chemical invention that was disclosed in the thesis.127 The court held 
the thesis was sufficiently “publicly accessible” because a person “interested 
in the art” could have found it exercising “reasonable diligence.”128 This is 
analogous to trade secret law’s “readily ascertainable” concept.   
The “readily ascertainable” concept was at work again in In re 
Lister,129 where the court held that a manuscript deposited with the U.S. 
Copyright Office was “publicly accessible,” to the extent that it could 
be located by persons interested in the art exercising “reasonable 
                                               
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (defining the term “trade secret” with respect to whether 
it is “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” to “another person who [could] 
obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”); see also ROWE 
& SANDEEN, supra note 19, at 91–93. 
 124. See LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 3 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14:27 (4th ed. 2020) (“Publication of the secret 
destroys its value as such.”). 
 125. See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Indeed, one of the primary purposes of patent systems is 
to disclose inventions to the public.”). 
 126. 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 127. Id. at 898. 
 128. Id. at 899–900. 
 129. 583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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diligence.”130 Although the court noted that time and expense might 
be required to view the manuscript at the Copyright Office, it found 
dispositive that “any member of the public” could potentially do so by 
submitting a proper request, or could even “hire someone local to 
inspect the manuscript on their behalf.”131 
Notably, courts use a similar analysis when interpreting the 
“patented” category of prior art.132 The Federal Circuit has held that 
foreign patents—which not unlike a German thesis can be hard to 
find—need to be “available to the public” as of the critical date to be 
counted as prior art, and interprets this phrase to mean reasonably 
accessible to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, and not 
deliberately kept secret.133 In more recent cases, the Federal Circuit used 
a similar analysis with respect to an article published on a website;134 a 
fourteen-slide presentation that was displayed for around two days at a 
conference;135 and a product catalog displayed at an annual trade show.136 
In the slide presentation case, In re Klopfenstein,137 the fourteen-slide 
presentation was only displayed on a billboard for two-and-a-half days 
                                               
 130. Id. at 1311–16 (quoting Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 
F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 131. Id. at 1313–14. But see id. at 1317 (holding there was insufficient evidence to 
establish that the manuscript was available more than one year prior to patent filing). 
 132. The “patented” category refers to both U.S. and foreign patents, see 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (1952) and 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1) (2018), but is more likely to trigger 
publicness issues with respect to foreign patents because they can be harder to access 
than domestic patents, which have long been searchable on the website of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). See Official Gazette, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/official-gazette (last modified Jan. 5, 2021). 
 133. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 427. Compare In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 
1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding German design patent was “available to the public” 
under Section 102(a)), with In re Ekenstam, 256 F.2d 321, 323–25 (C.C.P.A. 1958) 
(holding a foreign patent that is “deliberately kept secret” is not prior art). 
 134. Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software, Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1379–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding article maintained on “Risks Digest” website was a prior art 
“printed publication” as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) since it was “sufficiently 
accessible to the public interested in the art”). 
 135. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1347–50 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 136. GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, 908 F.3d 690, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(holding a catalog that disclosed a digital camera, which was displayed at a trade show 
focused on action sports vehicles and accessories, was a Section 102(b) “printed 
publication” because “persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject 
matter . . . exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” (quoting Kyocera Wireless 
Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
 137. 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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at one conference and less than one day at another conference.138 But 
the Federal Circuit held the presentation was “publicly accessible” 
because it was “shown to a wide variety of viewers, a large subsection of 
whom possessed ordinary skill” in the field to which the invention 
pertained.139 The court noted that for those specially skilled people, 
copying the information in the presentation “would have been a 
relatively simple undertaking.”140 Ease of copying was a factor, with the 
court noting that “[t]he more complex a display, the more difficult it 
will be for members of the public to effectively capture its 
information,” while the “simpler a display is, the more likely members 
of the public could learn it by rote [memory] or take notes adequate 
enough for later reproduction.”141 
Trade secret law has a similar standard to determine whether 
information like that in In re Klopfenstein is rendered too public to be 
protectable: the “generally known” and “readily ascertainable using 
proper means” tests. Just like In re Klopfenstein, a court in a trade secret 
case would have assessed whether a person in the field could discern 
the information without expending too great an effort.142 Importantly, this 
assessment has nothing to do with obviousness. It is about how easy it 
would have been for someone to access the information, not how easy 
it would have been for them to come up with the invention contained 
therein. 
While the question of whether information is readily ascertainable 
depends upon the circumstances, courts in trade secret cases involving 
the same sort of information as in In re Klopfenstein would have found 
that the disclosures rendered the information public. The reason is 
that information can be denied trade secret status even if it takes some 
effort to find it. For example, in a recent trade secret case, a federal 
court in the Northern District of Illinois held that coupon codes that 
were “imbedded in [plaintiff’s] website” were “available to the public” 
and not protectable under trade secret law, because no “subscription 
                                               
 138. Id. at 1351. 
 139. Id. at 1350. 
 140. Id. at 1352. 
 141. Id. at 1351. 
 142. Cf. Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 735–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that information regarding customers of a commercial roofing business was 
not “readily ascertainable” because the identities of customers in need of commercial 
roofing services was “only discoverable with great effort”). 
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or user fee [was] necessary to access the coupon codes,” and the codes 
could thus potentially be discerned.143 
One might object that trade secret law’s standard is too fact specific 
to apply in the patent context. After all, whether a disclosure counts as 
a “printed publication” is supposed to be a question of law.144 But the 
reality is that patent prior art cases are also highly fact dependent, as 
evidenced by the fact that similar fact patterns can reach distinct 
outcomes. 
For example, in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,145 the U.S. 
Court of Claims (whose jurisdiction was later assumed by the Federal 
Circuit) held that letters written to the U.S. Navy regarding research 
progress that were distributed in confidence to around thirty industry 
participants did not count as a “printed publication” and thus did not 
enter the prior art.146 Although seemingly inconsistent with In re 
Klopfenstein, this holding is easy to understand from the perspective of 
trade secret law. The information in the letters was disclosed to several 
entities, but it was not “readily ascertainable” using “proper means”—
given that it was treated as confidential by the United States 
government, and all the entities who received it treated it that way.147 
Indeed, if someone got access to the letter by circumventing their duty 
of confidentiality, they would have been exposed to a trade secret 
claim.148 Supreme Court case law in the government context buttresses 
the conclusion that such a letter could have been provided to the 
government under an assurance of privacy.149 
                                               
 143. CouponCabin, Inc. v. PriceTrace, LLC, No. 18-C-7525, 2019 WL 1572448, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2019); cf. Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288, 
1313–15 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding a compilation trade secret whose individual parts 
were on a public accessible website but that was only discernable as a whole by using a 
computer, was not generally known or readily ascertainable to “another person” using 
proper means); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. 
Supp. 1231, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that a temporary, fleeting publication of 
documents on a website was not enough to show “without evidence that the secrets 
[had] become generally known” to people in the field). 
 144. Seymore, supra note 5, at 505. 
 145. 553 F.2d 69 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam). 
 146. Id. at 77. 
 147. Id. at 74. 
 148. Cf. Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1452 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); see also infra notes 301–03 and accompanying text (describing the Evans 
case in detail). 
 149. Compare Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011–12 (1984) (holding 
that a party who submits trade secrets to the federal government may have a takings 
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Lockheed illustrates something very important about the patent prior 
art “printed publication” cases. Although the focus is on “public 
accessibility,” the courts in these cases are assessing more than just “de 
facto” public accessibility. They are assessing whether the information 
is being treated by its possessor as confidential. The fact that the Navy 
distributed its letter to industry participants under circumstances that 
gave rise to an implied duty of confidentiality was probably 
dispositive.150 What this indicates to us is that, just like in trade secrecy 
cases, courts in these non-traditional “printed publication” cases are 
assessing whether the person or entity in possession of the putative 
prior art reference has taken “reasonable measures” to maintain the 
information’s secrecy.151 
The reasonable efforts analysis arises less frequently in “printed 
publication” cases than it does in the activity (e.g., “public use”) cases 
for the obvious reason that publications will more often fail the basic 
secrecy prong by rendering information “generally known” or at least 
“readily ascertainable” to others. But even in “printed publication” 
cases, the courts in patent cases do assess whether reasonable secrecy 
precautions were undertaken. Indeed, in In re Klopfenstein, the Federal 
Circuit assessed “protective measures” as a specific factor in its 
analysis.152 As Seymore observes, especially post-Klopfenstein, the court 
is more likely to find a reference is not a printed publication if 
protective measures were taken to keep it secret and vice versa.153 The 
effect is to actively “encourage” inventors who want to present their 
                                               
claim when the government “had explicitly guaranteed to [submitters] an extensive 
measure of confidentiality and exclusive use”), with Gal-Or v. United States, 113 Fed. 
Cl. 540, 554–55 (2013) (holding that an inventor who disclosed information to the 
government without indicating it was confidential could not claim trade secret 
protection). 
 150. See Lockheed, 553 F.2d at 74 n.5 (noting that the defendant’s assertion that the 
confidential document was public was “not supported by precedent,” even though the 
court did not decide the issue). 
 151. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
 152. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Jockmus v. 
Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1928) (holding that a trade catalogue distributed to 
French customers of a German firm, with around 1,000 going out, was printed 
publication prior art, given that it was not “intended to be kept secret; its whole 
purpose was to be spread broadcast as far as possible”); GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP 
Holding LLC, 908 F.3d 690, 695 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog displayed at 
a trade show was a “printed publication” in part because it “was disseminated with no 
restrictions and was intended to reach the general public”). 
 153. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352. 
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work, and thereafter apply for a patent, to take secrecy precautions, in 
order “to create the reasonable expectation that the information will 
not be copied.”154 Otherwise, they are likely to trigger the one-year 
period in which to file a patent application. 
It is also worth pointing out that the Federal Circuit’s controversial 
inherency case law can arguably be explained by application of a 
“readily ascertainable” inquiry, combined with an assessment of 
“reasonable measures” to retain secrecy. For example, the Federal 
Circuit has held that even relatively hidden features of a disclosure—
such as trace amounts of a metabolite produced in a body—can be 
counted as “inherently” present in the prior art, even if they aren’t 
“expressly” revealed to the person of ordinary skill.155 This is consistent 
with the notion that publicness can encompass disclosures that would 
take a certain amount of effort to discern, and that aren’t being kept 
deliberately secret. 
To conclude, we think the analysis applied in “printed publication” 
cases closely tracks the analysis applied in trade secrecy cases. We 
discuss the normative implications of this similarity in Part IV. But first, 
we discuss so-called “activity prior art,” where the analogy is even more 
compelling and illustrates the extraordinary significance of “reasonable 
measures” to maintain secrecy for deciding whether a reference is public 
and constitutes prior art. 
2. The “public use” case law 
Pursuant to AIA Section 102, an invention is not novel if it is in “public 
use” prior to the patent application’s filing date. Pre-AIA, the invention 
could not be “known or used by others” in the United States prior to the 
invention date, or in “public use” by anyone more than one year before 
patenting.156 
Activity prior art—prior art that consists of alleged “public use” of the 
invention by the inventor or third parties, or “on sale” events such as the 
sale or offer for sale of a product embodying the claimed invention—is 
                                               
 154. Seymore, supra note 5, at 514–15. 
 155. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); see also MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 108 (2013); cf. Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 374 (2005) (arguing 
that the inherency doctrine is based on the notion that even if certain information 
isn’t in the public domain, “the public already gets the benefit of the claimed element 
or invention”). 
 156. See supra Part I. 
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very important for how patents are judged and invalidated. As Stephen 
Yelderman has recently shown, activity prior art is the most common 
form of prior art used in novelty invalidations in the district courts.157 
An obvious reason for this is that litigants in patent cases have more 
time and resources to look for these types of prior art than do patent 
examiners. 
Including activity prior art in the novelty (and nonobviousness) 
inquiries makes sense. Prior use, or even prior knowledge, of an 
invention can make information about an invention just as accessible 
to others as a traditional publication. Indeed, using an invention in 
plain view of a passerby arguably makes it more public than a 
description of the invention in a dissertation buried in a library 
(especially if the dissertation is in German). 
Even more so than in the printed publication cases, the standard of 
publicness applied to activity prior art—particularly “known or used by 
others” and “public use” cases158—resemble that of trade secret law. 
Courts virtually uniformly assess whether information about the 
invention that is the subject of prior use or knowledge was deliberately 
kept confidential and whether the protective measures taken were 
reasonable under the circumstances.159  
The obvious reason for the frequency of the reasonable measures 
analysis in activity prior art cases, as compared to “printed publication” 
and “patented” cases, is that inventions can be known or used without 
making the details visible to others. This is harder to do in a printed 
medium, where the reference will likely just fail the basic secrecy 
prong, by rendering information generally known or at least readily 
ascertainable using proper means.160 
Courts’ attention to secrecy precautions in the activity prior art case 
law dates from the original prior art category as it existed in the first 
Patent Act of 1790. The Patent Act of 1790 limited patents to 
inventions that were “not before known or used.”161 Similarly, the 
                                               
 157. Note that Yelderman found activity prior art to make up the majority of prior 
art in the district courts, but not at the USPTO or the Patent Trial and Appeals Board 
(PTAB). See Yelderman, supra note 14, at 860 (finding “the majority of anticipation 
invalidations (52%) relied on prior art classified as activities”). 
 158. We discuss the “on sale” cases separately below. 
 159. See cases cited in note 168, infra. 
 160. Cf. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 74 (Ct. Cl. 1977) 
(per curiam). 
 161. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (repealed 1793). 
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Patent Act of 1952 (which, as explained in Part I, is still in effect for 
some patents) provides that no patent will be available if the invention 
was “known or used by others” before the invention date.162 
The cases establish that “known or used” implies some degree of 
publicity related to the lack of security measures.163 We think the standard 
boils down to whether the information was being kept as a trade secret or 
not, and in particular whether the entity charged with knowing or using 
the information was taking sufficient secrecy precautions. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Division, National 
Lead Co.,164 which was decided prior to the creation of the Federal 
Circuit, is a good example.165 A close read of the decision shows that 
the court construed pre-AIA Section 102’s phrase “known or used by 
others” to encompass a trade secrecy-like standard of publicness. The 
critical finding was that Teplitz, an employee at another oil company, 
had been using the same oil prospecting method that the inventors 
(Rosaire and Horvitz) later tried to patent, and that this prior use 
rendered the method “known or used by others” prior to the invention 
date.166 Importantly, the court found that Teplitz and his employer 
failed to take sufficient secrecy precautions regarding the method, 
noting: “[t]he work was performed in the field under ordinary 
conditions without any deliberate attempt at concealment or effort to 
exclude the public and without any instructions of secrecy to the 
employees performing the work.”167 
The “public use” category of prior art provides an even richer source 
of decisions demonstrating the importance of measures to preserve 
secrecy in the prior art analysis. Indeed, the Federal Circuit currently 
defines public use as “any use of [the claimed] invention by a person 
other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or 
obligation of secrecy to the inventor.”168 The outcome in these cases 
                                               
 162. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1952). 
 163. Cf. CRAIG NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 280–81 (3d ed. 2014). 
 164. 218 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 165. Id. at 74–75 (explaining that no precedent requires an affirmative act to make 
the public aware of an invention). 
 166. Id. at 73–74 (holding the evidence was sufficient to show the proposed 
invention was publicly known or used before patented). 
 167. Id. at 74–75 (explaining the court, and patent law, does not require public 
knowledge to be shown to the public). 
 168. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re 
Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783 
(C.C.P.A. 1957) (explaining that public use includes “necessarily expos[ing the 
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often centers on whether the inventor permitted others to use her 
invention without placing them under any obligation of confidentiality.169 
The origin of this seemingly counterintuitive notion of what makes 
a use “public” is usually traced to the Supreme Court’s holding in Egbert 
v. Lippman.170 In Egbert, the inventor of an improved corset spring 
(Samuel Barnes) gave two samples of the invention to Francis Lee 
Egbert (Barnes’ then girlfriend and eventual wife).171 She wore them 
for more than two years before Barnes applied for a patent, and they 
allegedly showed and explained the corset spring to a friend, Joseph 
Sturgis, when he visited their house for dinner.172 Even though the 
spring was sewn into a corset and therefore, by its nature, was not 
visible to the public, the Court held it was in “public use” because it 
was given “to another” (to Egbert and to Sturgis) “to be used” by them 
“without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy.”173 
This holding baffled the dissenting Justice Miller, who wrote he was 
at “a loss to know the line between a private and a public use.”174 But 
the trade secrecy standard explains how the Egbert Court drew the line. 
The Court’s concept of public use was any sharing of the invention 
with another for use, without placing them under an “injunction of 
secrecy.”175 Use of the phrase “injunction of secrecy” is unlikely to be a 
coincidence because it also appeared in contemporary trade secret 
cases to refer to a duty of confidentiality that might give rise to an 
injunction.176 In sum, the corset spring was not the subject of 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy, given how liberally Barnes 
                                               
invention] to public view” without limitation); In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1134 (noting 
that “public use” is “any use of [an] invention by a person other than the inventor who 
is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor”); Petrolite 
Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (same). 
 169. Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 3d 630, 653 (E.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d, 914 
F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 170. 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (discussing the scope of public use). 
 171. Id. at 335, 337. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 336–37. 
 174. Id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing the public would be ignorant of this 
hidden invention in the corset and the patent should not be barred). 
 175. Id. at 336 (majority opinion). 
 176. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 154–
55 (Super. Ct. 1887) (explaining an inventor selling a trade secret process is entitled 
protection from disclosure). 
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shared it with his girlfriend and house guests, without first placing 
them under an obligation of confidentiality.177 
We can debate whether this was the correct decision from the 
perspective of modern domestic relationships, given that a duty to 
maintain secrecy does not necessarily have to be written down. A duty 
to maintain secrecy can often be inferred where the “relationship 
between the parties to the disclosure” indicates an intent to keep the 
information confidential.178 By today’s mores (if not the nineteenth 
century’s), the trade secrecy standard might have been met in Egbert 
because the most public part of the disclosure was to the inventor’s 
domestic partner.179 On the other hand, this would not justify the 
disclosure to Sturgis, which did not involve a promise of confidentiality, 
express or implicit.180 
Other cases from the same period indicate that courts thought of 
secrecy in similar ways—requiring deliberate efforts to conceal the 
invention to keep it from being treated as public. For example, just a 
few years after Egbert, the Supreme Court again denied a patent for an 
invention that the inventors had used more than two years prior to 
filing a patent. Citing its opinion in Egbert, the Court held that—even 
though the inventive design feature was effectively “hidden from view” 
since it was inside the safe, and revealing it would have required 
“destruction of the safes”—the inventors had not made deliberate 
efforts at concealment.181 Rather, like Barnes, they’d simply relied on 
the inherent nature of their safe designs to maintain the secrecy of the 
invention. Like in a trade secret case, where zero efforts to maintain 
                                               
 177. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335–37 (acknowledging the inventor gave his device to 
another without limitation). 
 178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41, cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 
1995) (explaining that courts recognize a duty to refrain from disclosure in some 
“confidential relationship[s]”). 
 179. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335–36. As Kara Swanson has observed, the Egbert Court’s 
impression that this was a “public” disclosure of information may have been influenced 
by contemporary ideas about the nature of a nonmarital sexual relationship. Kara 
Swanson, Corset, in A HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 50 OBJECTS 89, 91, 94–95 
(Claudy Op Den Camp & Dan Hunter eds., 2019) (describing the social norms of a 
close relationship at the time). Because Egbert was Barnes’ “intimate friend” rather 
than his wife, an express confidentiality agreement was deemed necessary to ensure 
her silence. Id. at 94. 
 180. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335–36. 
 181. Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 97 (1883) (asserting the legitimate use of a 
private safe was not concealment). 
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secrecy will disqualify an owner from enforcing trade secret rights, this 
simply was not enough.182 
The trade secrecy standard sheds still more light when prior art 
activity arises within an employment setting, where courts must assess 
whether a company has exercised sufficient secrecy precautions with 
respect to its own employees. In trade secret law, it is well established 
that a firm may share its secrets with employees under an express (or 
implied) obligation to maintain secrecy, without sacrificing trade 
secret status.183 But when a firm shares that same information without 
first ensuring its employees owe an obligation of secrecy, a finding of 
insufficient secrecy precautions and a loss of trade secret status is likely 
to follow.184 
The same principles are at work in the patent prior art cases 
involving sharing with employees: when a firm shares an invention with 
employees without taking secrecy precautions, even an otherwise 
internal disclosure can render the invention effectively public enough 
to enter the prior art. For example, in Electric Storage Battery Co. v. 
Shimadzu,185 the inventor, a firm named Shimadzu, sought and obtained 
patents for a machine and process that the defendant, Electric Storage 
Battery, had been using in its business for more than two years before 
Shimadzu filed for the patents.186 Although Electric Storage Battery 
had not deliberately disclosed the technology to the public, the 
Supreme Court concluded that its “ordinary” commercial usage was 
“public” for prior art purposes, and that Shimadzu’s patents were thus 
invalid.187 The Court reasoned that the “machine, process, and 
product” had become “well known to the employees in the plant” and 
“[few] efforts were made to conceal them from anyone who had a 
                                               
 182. See, e.g., Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 888, 898 (N.D. 
Ill. 2019) (holding a company’s failure to protect its trade secrets likely renders trade 
secret claims invalid). 
 183. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (explaining a trade 
secret is maintained when shared with another in confidence); see also RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. L. INST. 1939) (explaining that trade secret disclosure can 
be protected by privilege and confidence). 
 184. See, e.g., Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1282, 1284–85 (Vt. 2001). 
 185. 307 U.S. 5 (1939). 
 186. Id. at 20 (observing that no attempt was made to conceal the process). 
 187. Id. (holding that unless purposely concealed the commercial process was 
public); see also id. (“This use, begun more than two years before Shimadzu applied for 
patents 1,584,150 and 1,896,020, invalidated the claims in suit.”). 
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legitimate interest in understanding them.”188 Because the firm’s 
employees were under no obligation to keep the invention secret, they 
could have easily leaked it to the public at any time.189 
The Federal Circuit has built on the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Egbert and Shimadzu, deriving the definition of “public use” mentioned 
above.190 It described the public use rule in a 2013 case thus: “our case 
law understandably focuses on the limitations, restrictions, or secrecy 
obligations associated with a purported public use . . . . The degree of 
confidentiality necessary to avoid a finding of public use naturally 
depends on the circumstances.”191 
The court made this rule statement in a patent dispute between two 
pharmaceutical companies. And yet the court’s statements could have 
been cut out of a trade secret opinion by simply replacing the words 
“public use” with “trade secrecy-destroying event.” While the language 
used is different, the effect is the same as trade secret law’s reasonable 
measures requirement.192  
Of course, the trade secrecy standard of reasonable measures can go 
both ways. If the inventor does take sufficient secrecy precautions—and 
the information otherwise meets the standard of trade secrecy—then 
the reference will not be considered prior art. This explains patent 
prior art cases that appear contrary to Egbert and its progeny, where 
courts found prior use not to be sufficiently public.193 
For example, Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.194 involved the 
invention of the Rubik’s Cube, a three-dimensional puzzle capable of 
                                               
 188. Id. (stressing that a process is public if available and not purposely concealed). 
 189. Id. (implying the lack of concealment publicly exposed the process to anyone 
with legitimate interest). 
 190. See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that an invention is public when an inventor fails to conceal it in the given 
circumstances). 
 191. Pronova Biopharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. 549 F. App’x 934, 940 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 192. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (requiring reasonable measures to conceal a trade secret); 
see also ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 19, at 199–201. 
 193. Another pre-AIA category where the trade secrecy standard seems to apply is 
§ 102(g) prior inventor prior art. A similar rule applied: the prior inventor’s activity 
was not prior art if it had been “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed,” which should 
rationally be interpreted to exclude any prior invention that was deliberately kept as a 
trade secret. See Ellis, supra note 112, at 268–74 (describing situations in cases where 
inventions were secretly used but not held to be public use); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) 
(2006) (protecting pre-AIA patent rights for a first inventor). 
 194. 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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rotational movement.195 The inventor, Larry D. Nichols, was employed 
as a research scientist for the patentee, Moleculon. Moleculon 
obtained a patent on the Rubik’s Cube with Nichols named as the 
inventor, and eventually was in the position of having to enforce it 
against CBS.196 As part of its defense, CBS argued that Nichols had 
made an invalidating public use of the invention by discussing and 
sharing a prototype with others more than a year before the subject 
patent application was filed.197 
The Federal Circuit ultimately held in favor of the patentee, 
rejecting CBS’s public use argument.198 CBS’s alleged public use was 
based on Nichols’ decision to share a prototype of the cube (which he 
usually kept at home) with select individuals, including “a few close 
friends” and a colleague.199 The most public incident occurred when 
Nichols brought the prototype into his office at work and placed it on 
his desk. The president of Moleculon “entered Nichols’ office and 
happened to see the model sitting on his desk” and “expressed 
immediate interest in the puzzle,” prompting Nichols to explain its 
workings, and eventually leading to the company’s decision to patent 
and commercialize it.200 
When we consider the facts of Egbert and Shimadzu, the sequence of 
events in Moleculon sounds public enough. But trade secret law’s more 
nuanced reasonable efforts assessment reveals what the Moleculon 
decision was really about. While it is true that Nichols explained his 
puzzle to a few close colleagues and with his boss when asked, “the 
personal relationships and other surrounding circumstances” made 
this sharing reasonable in context.201 As the court put it, Nichols “never 
used the puzzle” and never “permitted” anyone else to use it “in a place 
or at a time when he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
and of confidentiality.” Moreover, those whom he allowed to use the 
puzzle had no “basis for inferring that the puzzle was being given over 
by Nichols for their free and unrestricted use.”202 
                                               
 195. Id. at 1263. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1263, 1265. 
 198. Id. at 1265–67 (explaining the inventor shared private use of the invention 
under his control). 
 199. Id. at 1263. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1265–66. 
 202. Id.; cf. Beachcombers v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding disclosure of improved kaleidoscope invention at a house 
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Moleculon, like Egbert before it, reflects courts’ assumptions about 
relationships. The Moleculon court viewed an inventor sharing his 
invention with work colleagues as less public than an inventor sharing 
his invention with his dinner guest and girlfriend (not-yet-wife). These 
are precisely the sorts of context-specific factors assessed in trade secret 
cases when applying the reasonable measures requirement. Through 
a trade secrecy lens, it seems clear the court concluded that Nichols 
had engaged in reasonable, albeit imperfect, efforts to maintain the 
secrecy of his invention.203 Because Nichols was reasonably preserving 
his invention as a trade secret, it wasn’t prior art against his company’s 
(or anyone’s) later attempt to get a patent. 
In a recent case, BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co.,204 albeit decided 
under pre-AIA law, the Federal Circuit confirmed that trade secrecy 
status matters—especially for third-party prior art. The prior art event 
was knowledge and use of a process by a third party (Celanese), which 
had extensively used the process in its U.S. plant for years before 
BASF’s patent application was filed.205 The district court invalidated 
BASF’s patent on the process, finding Celanese’s activities constituted 
pre-AIA Section 102(a) “known or used by others” and Section 102(b) 
“public use,”206 stating that whether the activity was “secret or 
confidential is immaterial.”207 
The Federal Circuit reversed, confirming that Celanese’s efforts at 
secrecy—in particular “the existence of relevant confidentiality 
agreements” with employees and visitors to the plant, and “the degree 
to which they were honored”—were absolutely material, and could end 
up being dispositive.208 However, because the parties disagreed on 
whether Celanese’s practices met the confidentiality standards of prior 
                                               
party hosted by the designer and attended by twenty to thirty guests was “public use,” 
given that the designer “made no efforts to conceal the device or keep anything about 
it secret”). 
 203. Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1265–66; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV 
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining the impracticality of perfect 
security). 
 204. 955 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 205. Id. at 962 (describing evidence of the third-party giving tours of the plant, 
which exposed the secret process to the public). 
 206. Id. (explaining that the district court upheld the public use bar). 
 207. Id. at 962 (quoting BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co., No. 4:17-cv-00251-RSB-
BWC 1, 22 (S.D. Ga. 2018) (lower court summary judgment order)). 
 208. BASF, 955 F.3d at 965–66 (citing Elec. Battery Storage Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 
U.S. 5, 20 (1939) (relying on efforts to purposefully conceal an invention)). 
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cases like Shimadzu (not enough) and Moleculon (enough), summary 
judgment was inappropriate.209 In sum, the outcome boiled down to a 
textbook inquiry into the reasonableness of the company’s secrecy 
precautions. 
C. Exceptions to the Trade Secrecy Standard 
The informed reader is likely at this point to object that a trade 
secrecy standard for patent prior art is inconsistent with a significant 
segment of existing patent prior art jurisprudence. However, as we 
show below, for the most part, these exceptions do not illustrate a 
divergent idea of “publicness.” Rather, they are based on other 
considerations separate from publicness. More generally, the existence 
of exceptions from the general rule does not dilute the trade secrecy 
standard’s explanatory power. To the contrary, the fact that there are 
some outliers only tends to prove that trade secrecy qualifying uses of 
an invention don’t usually count as patent prior art—unless a policy 
other than publicness is at play. What is more, the most important of 
the exceptions to the trade secrecy standard is ironically generated by 
the existence of trade secret law itself—specifically, by courts’ 
understanding that trade secrecy is an alternative to patent law, and 
the inventor is supposed to have to choose between the two. 
1. When failing trade secrecy doesn’t mean public 
For important public policy reasons, there is case law where a 
reference (the disclosure event) is fully public—obviously not a trade 
secret—and yet courts hold the disclosure not to be in the prior art. 
The principal example is the “experimental use” defense as expressed 
in cases like Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.210 There, the inventor had actually 
laid down pavement on an open city street to test whether his invention 
worked. The Supreme Court held that, despite its publicness, this was 
not barring “public use” because it was done by the inventor only “by 
way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection.”211 
The experimental use defense is, we think, a minor counterpoint to 
the trade secrecy standard for publicness designed to address a 
countervailing policy consideration; namely, the need of inventors to 
                                               
 209. Id. (questioning whether the evidence supported that concealment was 
sufficient for protection of the patent). 
 210. 97 U.S. 126, 129, 135 (1877) (explaining that the inventor was still constructing 
the invention). 
 211. Id. at 134 (describing an inventor’s limitation on testing certain inventions). 
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test public-facing inventions before commercializing them. In applying 
the defense, courts assess a variety of factors besides publicness, 
including “the necessity for the testing or evaluation” and “whether 
there was payment for the use.”212 They also assess factors that are 
highly consistent with the trade secrecy analysis, such as “whether the 
inventor monitored the use and kept a laboratory notebook or other 
experimental records . . . and whether there was a confidentiality 
agreement.”213 In other words, experimental use is definitely a 
potential exception to the general rule, but its fact-specific and narrow 
application means that most uses of inventions not meeting the trade 
secrecy standard will be deemed public. 
2. When maintaining trade secrecy is still public 
The bigger body of exceptions to the trade secrecy standard for 
patent prior art involves the secret utilization of inventions prior to 
patenting that are nonetheless deemed public for prior art purposes. 
a. On sale bar 
The first exception is Section 102’s “on sale” bar, which provides that 
a claimed invention will not be novel if it was “on sale” before the 
relevant date.214 
In one sense, the on sale bar is an affirmation of the trade secrecy 
standard for patent prior art. Most conceivable sales of an invention 
will probably fail the trade secrecy standard because sale of the 
invention will destroy its trade secrecy status.215 Products sold on the 
open market are often visible or can be easily reversed engineered, and 
thus are difficult to keep as trade secrets. As one court put it: 
“[w]hether viewed though the rubric of ‘not secret’ or ‘not subject to 
reasonable efforts at maintaining secrecy,’ it should go without saying 
                                               
 212. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 1519–21 (dissenting from the en banc denial and providing factors to 
determine if inventive activity was experimental in nature). 
 214. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2018) (effective filing date), with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) (2006) (more than one year before the application date). 
 215. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 1985) (“Often, the nature 
of a product lends itself to being readily copied as soon as it is available on the 
market.”); see also, e.g., Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom’s Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1454–55 
(11th Cir. 1991) (sale of plaintiff’s product destroyed “any reasonable expectation of 
secrecy” as to unpatented parts). 
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that information, systems, or methods revealed by publicly-marketed 
products are not true trade secrets.”216 
Indeed, Pennock v. Dialogue217—the very case in which the Supreme 
Court first announced that the Patent Act encompasses an on sale 
bar—involved an inventor selling an invention in a way that fails the 
trade secrecy standard. There, the inventor had actually sold the 
invention for seven years and used it in public by laying “nearly two miles 
and a half in length of hose” before filing his patent application.218 
Nonetheless, inventions can still be considered “on sale” under 
Section 102, even if the information otherwise qualifies for trade secret 
status.219 It is entirely possible to place an invention on sale while 
keeping its details confidential in a way that preserves applicable trade 
secret protection.220 But for important public policy reasons having a 
lot to do with the disclosure purposes of patent law, courts still consider 
secret on sale activity as a bar to patentability. 
In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,221 the Supreme 
Court confirmed that, even post-AIA, an inventor who places his 
invention on sale in secret—without revealing the details of the 
invention—triggers the on sale bar.222 The allegedly disqualifying sale 
at the center of Helsinn was a “supply and purchase agreement” (a 
future sale agreement) that was publicly announced but kept the 
details of the invention secret.223 This might have qualified as a trade 
secret, because all parties were contractually bound to maintain the 
                                               
 216. Action Learning Sys., Inc. v. Crowe, No. CV-14-5112-GW(SHx), 2014 WL 
12564011, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (explaining public knowledge destroys 
trade secrets). 
 217. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). 
 218. Id. at 9 (explaining the invention had been in public use and publicly sold for 
seven years before patenting); see also supra note 54. 
 219. In what was until recently the leading on-sale bar case, Pfaff v. Wells, the 
Supreme Court effectively ignored the question of publicness, announcing the rule 
that the on sale bar is triggered if: (1) there is a commercial “offer for sale” of the 
invention, and (2) the invention is in a state that is “ready for patenting.” Pfaff v. Wells 
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998); see also Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 633 (2019) (affirming Pfaff and further holding secret sales 
can violate the on sale bar). 
 220. Dennis Crouch, Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior Art?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 10, 2012), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-eliminate-secret-prior-art.html 
(discussing interpretations of how secret inventions may affect prior art in patent law). 
 221. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
 222. Id. at 630. 
 223. Id. at 631. 
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secrecy of the relevant information, and the information wasn’t 
rendered generally known or readily ascertainable in the process.224 
But nonetheless the Supreme Court held it constituted “on sale” 
activity that triggered the on sale bar,225 thereby violating the trade 
secrecy standard we propose. 
There are several explanations for this strict treatment of “secret 
sales” activity. First, inventors who sell their inventions in secret are by 
definition trying to commercialize them in secret. This triggers the 
special policy concerns addressed by the Metallizing doctrine, discussed 
further below. Inventors would be able to impermissibly lengthen their 
period of exclusivity and circumvent the choice between patenting and 
trade secrecy.226 Second, relatedly, the Helsinn case involved the 
inventor’s own secret sale activity. Courts often draw a distinction 
between inventors’ secret sales activity and third parties’ secret sales 
activity. The latter is typically seen as less problematic and is more likely 
to be judged based on a trade secrecy standard: if trade secret, then 
not public.227 In contrast, if this same activity originates with the 
inventor, instead of a third party, it is more likely to be deemed a 
disqualifying event—in part because inventor use triggers those same 
policy concerns, which we will now discuss.228 
                                               
 224. It is hard to find a public reliance problem since under the structure of the 
deal the invention would only have become known to the inventor and the 
manufacturer. See John C. Williams, Note, Giving Meaning to “Otherwise Available to the 
Public”: How Helsinn Perpetuates a Version of the On-Sale Bar to Patentability that 
Disproportionately Burdens Small Inventors, 97 TEX. L. REV. 421, 435 (2018). 
 225. Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 634. 
 226. See discussion infra. 
 227. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (holding sale of the output of a process by a third party not “on sale” activity 
because the sale was not of the invention itself, and because the invention was shared 
only with those who were “legally bound to keep their knowledge confidential”); see 
also Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 519 (2d 
Cir. 1946) (“[I]t was not the inventor, but a third person who used the machine 
secretly and sold the product openly, and there was therefore no question either of 
abandonment or forfeiture by the inventor.”); cf. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging 
Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding even third-party secret “on sale” 
activity counts as prior art, so long as it really constitutes placing the invention on sale). 
 228. Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d. 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 589 n.2 (discussing party specific 
aspect of § 102(b)). 
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b. Abandonment and the “Metallizing doctrine” 
What might seem to be the most damning body of case law for the 
trade secrecy standard are situations where an inventor has made 
commercial use of the invention in complete secret but without 
putting the invention itself on sale.229 Common examples include sale 
of output from a machine invention that can be kept in secret or use 
of a labor-saving process invention in the backroom. In these cases, the 
inventor manages to make money off the invention without disclosing 
it or actually putting it on sale.230 
The long-standing rule in these cases is that, even though the on sale 
bar is not triggered, and even though the use is not “public” in the 
common sense of the word, secret commercialization by an inventor 
causes the invention to enter the prior art as a “public use” pursuant 
to Section 102. This is typically called the “Metallizing doctrine.” 
This doctrine gained fullest expression in, and takes its name from, 
Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon 
Bearing & Auto Parts Co.231 In Metallizing, the patentee sought a patent 
for an improved process for conditioning a metal surface (called 
metallizing).232 More than a year before filing a patent application, the 
inventor had used the metallizing process commercially in secret.233 
The trial court initially held that, since the “use was not public but 
secret,” it could not be an invalidating “public use” under the statute 
of the time.234 But the Second Circuit overruled the trial court, holding 
that the commercial nature of the use by the inventor meant this was 
effectively a “public use” for purposes of the statutory bar of the time.235 
The Metallizing doctrine actually has its origin in the earlier doctrine 
of “abandonment,” which was added to the Patent Act in 1839 and was 
continued in the 1952 Act.236 It provided that a person was not entitled 
                                               
 229. See, e.g., Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 517–20 (explaining the differing rationale for 
this policy). 
 230. See Merges, supra note 59, at 1034. 
 231. 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 232. Id. at 517. 
 233. Id. at 517–18. 
 234. Id. (quoting the Patent Act of 1870). 
 235. Judge Hand also took the time to explain why this is not an abandonment case 
(which presupposes a “deliberate” surrender of the right to patent), but rather a 
forfeiture case. See id. at 520. 
 236. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1952); see also Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 
354 (1839). 
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to a patent if “he has abandoned the invention.”237 One way inventors 
“abandon” their invention was if they had been “concealing [it] and 
delaying application for patent in an endeavor to extend the term of 
the patent protection beyond the period fixed by the statute.”238 The 
idea was that inventors who act like they are going to rely on secrecy 
instead of patenting do not thereafter deserve a patent.239 
There is no denying that in the abandonment and Metallizing non-
public “public use” cases, courts hold the opposite of what the trade 
secrecy standard would suggest is the right outcome. Thus, we do not 
try to argue these cases are consistent with a trade secrecy standard of 
publicness. Rather, we argue that this does not dilute the trade secrecy 
standard’s general explanatory power for deciding what is “public” 
under patent law. To the contrary, the exceptions only prove the 
general rule that trade secrecy uses of the invention don’t usually 
count, unless a policy other than publicness is at play. 
The Metallizing doctrine is clearly a policy-driven exception to what 
is otherwise the general rule. It is not grounded on publicness at all.240 
Its purpose is to stop the inventor from unfairly extending her 
monopoly rents beyond what patent law was designed to provide, and 
to force the inventor to choose between patent and trade secret law to 
make sure she cannot get both.241 As Judge Hand observed in 
Metallizing, the inventor is supposed to make an affirmative choice 
between patent or trade secret protection.242 This is why the inventor 
who tries to commercialize in secret beyond the grace period allotted 
by law “forfeits his right [to patent] regardless of how little the public 
may have learned about the invention.”243 
                                               
 237. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1952). 
 238. Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 15 (1939); see also Shaw v. 
Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 302 (1833) (discussing abandonment under the text of the 1793 
Act, stating that “a public use does not affect the inventor’s right, unless it proves that 
he has dedicated or abandoned his invention to the public”). 
 239. See Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 698–99 (6th Cir. 
1917) (supporting the holding of abandonment partly because of the “inconsistency 
between the right to a trade secret and the right to a patent”). 
 240. Dmitry Karshtedt, The Riddle of Secret Public Use: A Response to Professor Lemley, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2015); see also Alan L. Durham, Lost Art and the Public Domain, 
49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1257, 1296 (2017). 
 241. See Karshtedt, supra note 240, at 164; see also Merges, supra note 59, at 1042; 
Lemley, supra note 79, at 1122; Ellis, supra note 112, at 259–62. 
 242. See Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 
520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 243. Id. 
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In other words, the most significant exception to the trade secrecy 
standard is motivated by the existence of trade secret law itself. The 
inventor did something wrong in failing to make an election between 
patent and trade secrecy and is being penalized for that failing in her 
later attempt to obtain a patent. 
This principle of election is well-grounded in law and policy.244 The 
Supreme Court itself stressed the importance of a forced choice 
between patents and trade secrets in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
when it explained why trade secret law was not preempted by patent 
law. The Court held trade secret law could co-exist with patent law, in 
part, because most inventors, when given the choice, would choose 
patent over trade secret protection.245 Crucial to the Court’s reasoning 
was the assumption that an inventor cannot get both forms of 
protection; instead, the inventor has to patent within one year or rely 
on trade secrecy. This, in turn, allowed the Court to find that trade 
secret law does not conflict with the disclosure purposes of patent law 
and was not preempted by patent law.246 
In sum, for the most part,247 the places where the trade secrecy 
standard is not followed can be explained by valid policy concerns 
separate from considerations of publicness. 
IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE TRADE SECRECY STANDARD 
So far, we have shown that, at a descriptive level, courts tend to follow 
the trade secrecy standard for what is public enough to enter the prior 
art. This Part argues that the trade secrecy standard is not just 
                                               
 244. But see Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable Patent 
Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. REV. 261, 272–77 (2012) 
(examining in depth the district court’s finding of fact and giving a fuller picture of 
the factors influencing the inventor’s election). 
 245. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490–91 (1974). 
 246. Id. at 491–93 (recognizing the necessity of choice between trade secret and 
patent protection); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 166 (1989) (noting that for nearly 200 years the law of unfair competition and 
state trademark law have coexisted with patent law). See generally Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business 
Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 377, 380 (2002) (discussing the legal 
and commercial considerations of pursuing trade secret or patent protection). 
 247. Unfortunately, there is some case law suggesting that third-party trade secret 
uses—even those that do not rise to the level of placing the invention on sale—can 
potentially be deemed “public use” (or “known or used by others” under the pre-AIA 
law). In Part IV, we argue this a place where courts have veered from the trade secrecy 
standard without a good justification, and where the law should be altered accordingly. 
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descriptively accurate—it is also normatively desirable. We are not 
alone in viewing trade secrecy as a good rule of thumb for deciding 
what is or is not available to the public,248 but here we work out the 
details for why this is so. There are several reasons courts may have 
turned, implicitly or explicitly, to trade secrecy principles to address 
the publicness of prior art. 
First, as noted in Part I, the Patent Act doesn’t provide an 
overarching definition of publicness, leaving it up to federal courts to 
do so. Second, trade secret law is the main legal regime with rules 
specifically designed to determine whether a particular disclosure of 
information is public or secret.249 Plentiful trade secret case law 
addresses the public nature of informational disclosures in a range of 
scenarios, from using a process inside a partially exposed factory250 to 
sharing information under a duty of confidentiality.251 Third, the 
Federal Circuit (and before that the other federal courts charged with 
deciding patent appeals) has been dealing with trade secret issues that 
arise in patent cases coming up from the district courts for over a 
century, so is likely to know this area of law very well.252 
Yet, the availability and intuitive appeal of a tool isn’t a justification 
for it and doesn’t show it is superior to other options. In this Part, we 
discuss two major policy reasons for why the trade secrecy standard is 
advantageous for patent law and innovation policy. 
A. Supporting the Nonremoval Principle 
First, the trade secrecy standard for publicness prevents information 
from being taken away from people who have already had access to it, 
and who may have justifiably relied on its disclosure. As explained in 
Part II, the key question for prior art jurisprudence is how to decide 
whether a disclosure of information is sufficiently “available to the 
public” to trigger what Merges calls the nonremoval principle: don’t 
                                               
 248. Ellis, supra note 112, at 267; see also Holbrook, supra note 1, at 154–56. 
 249. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
 250. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013–14 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
 251. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375–76 (7th Cir. 1953). 
 252. 4,675 Federal Circuit (and predecessor court) cases referenced “trade secret” 
between 1906 and 2020 (305 reported; 4,370 unreported), according to a Lexis 
Advance search for “trade secret!” in all Federal Circuit, United States Court of Federal 
Claims, U.S. Court of International Trade, and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
cases, dated between January 1, 1906 and January 1, 2020. 
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grant patents for information people already possess.253 Merges and 
Duffy have also called this the “anti-backsliding” principle: “[p]arties 
cannot obtain patent rights encompassing practices that already exist 
in the public domain (or that would enter the public domain prior to 
the expiration of the patent at issue).”254 
As this quote suggests, the nonremoval/anti-backsliding rule is 
supposed to be relatively strict. It has to take into account both 
disclosures to the relevant public that have already occurred by the 
critical date, and disclosures that are just about to occur, because of the 
context in which the invention exists or was shared in the prior art. 
Trade secrecy status provides an effective way to enforce this rule. 
Simply put, people are more likely to have encountered and to have 
justifiably and legally relied upon information that does not qualify as 
a trade secret; and they are less likely to have encountered and 
justifiably and legally relied upon information that does qualify as a 
trade secret. 
There are several specific reasons why the trade secret standard 
works so well in these respects. 
1. A functional approach to publicness 
First, the trade secrecy standard provides a functional standard for 
assessing publicness that focuses on the real-world effects of an 
informational disclosure, not on the form it takes. Whereas the patent 
prior art jurisprudence obsesses over fitting informational disclosures 
into categories, the trade secrecy standard recognizes that information 
can take essentially any form. The real issue is whether it has become 
sufficiently public. 
2. A well-developed concept of the relevant public 
Second, unlike patent prior art jurisprudence, trade secret law has a 
well-developed concept of the community from whose perspective the 
secrecy or publicness of a reference is determined. In trade secret law, 
information’s publicness is determined from the perspective of 
“another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure 
or use of the information.”255 
This concept is clarifying. It illustrates that the people (or person) 
whose interests matter are those who might realistically want to find 
                                               
 253. MERGES, supra note 25, at 142–43. 
 254. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, at 389. 
 255. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
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information about the invention and derive economic value from it. 
This can include experts in the field and employees in the relevant 
industry, and it can also potentially include members of the general 
public.256 
In contrast, patent prior art cases have been inconsistent on whose 
perspective matters for assessing the publicness of prior art. As noted 
in Part III, the Federal Circuit often states the relevant public is the 
“person interested in the art.”257 But the court has also stated that 
availability of a patent or printed publication to a single member of the 
“general public” is sufficient to turn a reference into prior art.258 
Some have suggested the patent prior art standard is fundamentally 
much stricter than trade secret law’s, and that it is “much easier to lose 
patent rights than trade secrets.”259 But we don’t think that is the case. 
Trade secret law’s “readily ascertainable” prong supplements the “not 
generally known” prong, and renders information public, so long as it 
can be discerned with “reasonable effort” utilizing legal means.260 
Second, the “reasonable measures” requirement supplements the 
trade secrecy standard even further, rendering information public if 
it’s not protected using reasonable secrecy precautions.261  
The Federal Circuit has already acknowledged the similarity 
between the two legal regimes’ concepts of publicness, albeit going in 
the opposite direction—citing to patent prior art jurisprudence to 
explain why a trade secret disclosed in a foreign patent is too public to 
                                               
 256. Holbrook similarly asserts that it makes more sense to ask whether prior art 
would be accessible to a “reasonable competitor,” than to a PHOSITA, and that “[t]o 
inform the reasonable competitor construct, patent law may want to turn to trade 
secrecy.” Holbrook, supra note 1, at 193. 
 257. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting the “‘printed 
publication’ bar requires that the publication be accessible to the interested public”). 
 258. MARK LEMLEY ET AL., 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AGE: 
2020 181 (2020); see also Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 
1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (website public); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (presentation public). 
 259. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 258, at 181. But as discussed in Part III, we think trade 
secret law is not less strict because of the need to apply the “readily ascertainable” and 
“reasonable measures” requirements in addition to the “generally known” 
requirement. See discussion in Part III, supra. 
 260. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); see, e.g., Flotec, Inc. v. S. Rsch., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 
1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
 261. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
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be a trade secret.262 Patent prior art jurisprudence, in turn, could 
benefit from drawing more expressly on trade secret law.263 
3. Highlighting the importance of measures to maintain secrecy 
The most important reason for patent prior art jurisprudence to 
embrace trade secret law’s standard for publicness is that trade secrecy 
specifically addresses whether information has been deliberately kept 
secret. This creates a critical additional layer of protection against 
removal of information from the public. 
When it comes to protecting others’ reliance on known information, 
the “reasonable measures” requirement serves two functions. 
First, when a possessor of information about a new invention 
(including but not limited to the inventor) takes measures to keep the 
information secret, this supports an inference of actual secrecy.264 
Second, when an inventor or other actor in possession of an 
invention takes measures to preserve its secrecy, like confidentiality 
ledgers and NDAs, this places other people on “notice” that the 
invention is intended to be kept confidential and that recipients of the 
information concerning the invention are not free to use it in their 
own endeavors.265 If others use the information anyway, ignoring these 
signs, this would constitute a “bad act” that would subject them to a 
trade secret lawsuit or a patent infringement claim if the invention was 
timely patented.266 By the same token, where trade secrecy is 
established it seems fair to allow the inventor to get a patent on the 
invention, even if it would later deprive those “on-notice” recipients of 
the right to make, use, or sell the invention in future. 
On the other hand, if the opposite is true—if there were too few 
secrecy precautions in place—it does not seem fair to deprive people of 
the ability to freely use what they’ve gleaned without obvious restrictions 
on reuse. The Federal Circuit’s holding in Baxter International, Inc. v. 
                                               
 262. See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 263. Accord Holbrook, supra note 1, at 193; Anderson, supra note 113, at 921. 
 264. Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 265. Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy 
Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH, supra note 102, at 46–47, 59. 
 266. If the bad actor goes on to disclose the invention further, such as through 
public sale, the inventor would not be able to obtain patent protection and would only 
have a trade secret remedy, see Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 
1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997), discussed infra. 
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Cobe Laboratories, Inc.267 provides a highly illuminating illustration of 
this second scenario and shows how courts use the reasonable secrecy 
precautions inquiry to protect these reliance interests.268 
In Baxter, the Federal Circuit found that a non-patentee third-party 
research scientist named Dr. Jacques Suaudeau had made “public use” 
of a claimed centrifuge invention, even though Dr. Suaudeau was 
essentially doing “private laboratory work.”269 The patent was for a 
sealless centrifuge for separating blood into its components.270 Dr. 
Suaudeau had used the centrifuge in a National Institute of Health 
(NIH) laboratory to conduct tests for around forty-three hours.271 
Note that there is no “forfeiture” or “abandonment” principle at play 
here: Dr. Suaudeau was not himself the patentee. Instead, this was a 
case about protecting the public’s interests in the information. Yet 
there was really only one identifiable reason for the court’s conclusion 
of publicness: Dr. Suaudeau had not undertaken any significant efforts 
to conceal his use from visitors to the lab.272 In fact, Dr. Suaudeau 
testified that the NIH had an “anti-secrecy” policy, meaning duties of 
confidentiality were deliberately not put in place.273 As the court 
described it, the laboratory “was located in a public building,” 
with ”people coming and looking, people flowing into the lab” and 
“others at NIH [coming] into [the doctor’s] laboratory and 
observ[ing] the centrifuge in operation, including co-workers, who 
were under no duty to maintain it as confidential.”274 
The court seemed concerned with the prospect of taking away from 
the public an invention to which they already had relatively 
unrestricted access. Any of the other people could have discerned Dr. 
Suaudeau’s centrifuge, assessed its operation, or even taken photos or 
notes on how it worked. Those people would have had no reason to 
think they could not thereafter use or copy the invention and would 
have been justified in doing so. If the patentee (Baxter) were able to 
                                               
 267. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 268. Id. at 1058–59. For an engaging summary, discussion, and critique of this case, 
see Edwin D. Garlepp, Baxter v. Cobe: Public Use or Secret Prior Art?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
381, 397–98 (1997). 
 269. Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1060–62. This decision irritated Judge Newman. Id. at 1061–
63 (Newman, J., dissenting.). 
 270. Id. at 1056. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. at 1058. 
 273. Id. at 1059. 
 274. Id. at 1058–59 (quoting Dr. Suaudeau’s testimony). 
2021]   THE TRADE SECRECY STANDARD FOR PATENT PRIOR ART 1319 
 
patent the centrifuge, this would unfairly deprive those people of what 
they already had, and potentially subject them to a patent 
infringement lawsuit for doing what they had no reason to believe was 
off limits. 
By assessing whether “reasonable efforts” were used to safeguard the 
centrifuge invention, the Baxter court was able to discern whether 
people interested in the art might have plausibly come into contact 
with and reasonably relied upon it. (Note too that the way the Baxter 
court assessed the “reasonableness” of the lab’s secrecy precautions is 
precisely analogous to how courts do so in trade secret cases involving 
the scenario of a facility that is open to visitors.275) 
An even more extreme example of the protective function of secrecy 
precautions in the prior art analysis is JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc.276 
In JumpSport, the Federal Circuit held that a patent on an improved 
trampoline with a safety fence extending above the rebounding surface 
was barred due to prior “public use” of the trampoline by the inventor’s 
neighbors in the inventor’s own backyard.277 Like the undergarment in 
Egbert, the trampoline in JumpSport forces us to stretch our imagination 
of what is “public.”278 
Yet when seen from the trade secrecy lens, the inventor’s decision to 
use the trampoline in his backyard and give his neighbors access, was 
a “public” use. The inventor didn’t “control access to [the trampoline] 
or make any effort to keep it confidential.”279 The fact that the inventor 
failed to exercise control or to use confidentiality procedures wasn’t a 
moral failing or anything like that. It just suggests that information 
about the trampoline probably leaked out to others, and that anyone 
who saw it would have been justified in relying on it and making a copy 
                                               
 275. Compare Columbus Bookkeeping & Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Ohio State Bookkeeping, 
LLC, No. 11AP-227, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5655, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2011) 
(holding the client list was not a trade secret because it was maintained in a shared 
office, computer passwords were easily accessible, and filing cabinets were often left 
unlocked), with Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 415 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980) (holding the hose production process was a trade secret because visitors of 
the plant were placed under security observation, escorted throughout, and screens 
and barriers were placed around the proprietary machines). 
 276. 191 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 277. Id. at 929, 935. 
 278. See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 156 (discussing how this line of cases is also 
inconsistent with the possession requirement). 
 279. JumpSport, 191 F. App’x at 935. 
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of it. In those circumstances, it would be unfair to take back what had 
lawfully been obtained and justifiably relied upon. 
B. Streamlining Inventors’ Incentives 
The second major benefit of the trade secrecy standard is that it 
protects inventors’ (and patentees’280) interests by providing them with 
a clear and efficient guidepost for how to keep their information out 
of the prior art. It keeps inventors focused only on taking “reasonable,” 
i.e., efficient, secrecy precautions, and helps them to recognize when 
they’ve engaged in a triggering prior art event.281 
The patent system serves an important function in affecting 
inventors’ incentives to invent and commercialize their inventions,282 
and to disclose new information to the public through the patent 
system.283 Therefore, a major concern with our proposal to use trade 
secrecy as the standard for patent prior art is that too much will be 
considered “public,” and that inventors will too frequently be denied 
patents. Think of Baxter and JumpSport, where inventors lost the right 
to patent due to relatively private disclosures—in a lab and a backyard 
respectively. Think of poor Mr. Barnes in Egbert, who shared his 
invention only in the privacy of his home. These forfeitures have 
troubled some commentators.284 Timothy Holbrook, for instance, 
suggests that “Egbert and its progeny” (sometimes called “noninforming” 
use cases285) are “wrongly decided” because they “do not demonstrate 
sufficient communication of the invention to the public.”286    
However, while it sometimes appears harsh, we think the trade 
secrecy standard actually strengthens inventors’ incentives by making the 
path to patenting more efficient and clarifying the scenarios that will 
                                               
 280. We discuss patentees and inventors as the same group, but of course patents 
are freely assignable, and inventors do not always own or retain the patent on their 
inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 281. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174, 177–78 
(7th Cir. 1991) (applying the reasonable efforts test to patent piece drawings). 
 282. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 24–36 
(2015) (discussing at length the interplay of the patents and commercialization). 
 283. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 553–54 (2009). 
 284. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 154–56. 
 285. ADELMAN, supra note 155, at 121. 
 286. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 156. Holbrook argues instead for a “possession” 
framework, asking: was the information within the public’s possession or not? Id. at 
194; see also ADELMAN, supra note 155, at 118–25. 
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trigger a prior art event. To see the positive effect on incentives, we must 
assess two different scenarios: inventor prior art and third-party prior art. 
1. Inventor prior art 
The first scenario is where the prior art is created by the inventor 
herself.287 Start with the corset-spring disclosed and used by the 
inventor’s partner in Egbert more than a year prior to filing for a patent. 
Imagine this inventor-generated use is treated as prior art by virtue of 
the fact that trade secrecy failed since Mr. Barnes didn’t take sufficient 
secrecy precautions. 
It is unlikely this would undermine inventors’ incentives to invent, 
commercialize, and disclose. Far from it. When the barring public use 
was done by the inventor or someone in the inventor’s control, 
inventors can patent these inventions—they just have to take 
“reasonable” measures to keep the invention secret until they are ready 
and file for a patent within one year of failing to do so.288 
What is more, “reasonableness” in trade secret law is similar to the 
“reasonableness” standard of tort law: it only requires inventors to take 
actions to the extent the costs of doing so are outweighed by the benefits. So, for 
example, if the expected value of an invention is $100, and the risk 
others will copy it is very low, she should not be expected to spend 
millions on secrecy precautions.289 As Judge Posner famously put it, 
“perfect security is not optimum security.”290 
So in Egbert, Barnes was perfectly free to patent his corset, so long as 
he took “reasonable” measures to keep the corset springs secret in 
context. This would not mean Barnes had to spend thousands of 
dollars on fences and locks or decline to share and test at all. He could, 
for example, have asked his partner and house guest to sign non-
disclosure agreements, and thereby put them on notice that they 
should not share the corset with others.291 
Moreover, imagine Barnes failed to take the necessary precautions, 
slipped up, and allowed his invention to lose trade secrecy status. Not 
only would this deprive him of the right to patent, assuming the use 
                                               
 287. Cf. Amy R. Motomura, Innovation and Own Prior Art, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 
2021). 
 288. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
 289. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 357 (2003). 
 290. Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 291. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
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was discovered by an examiner or challenger in court, but he would 
also lose the right to protect his invention as a trade secret. As a result, 
Barnes would have one clear choice: he would have to file a patent 
within one year, or (under the AIA) make a “saving disclosure” and file 
within one year of that event.292 In sum, under the trade secrecy 
standard, inventors like Barnes would have a certain rule telling them 
what to do—take efficient secrecy precautions in the early stages of 
inventing. And they would know the consequences of failing to do so–
no patent, and no trade secret. These rules would inform inventors’ 
actions, reducing uncertainty and guiding them towards efficient 
secrecy precautions. 
A prescriptive message emerges from this discussion. There is 
currently a good deal of uncertainty among inventors, especially 
researchers without the benefit of good legal advice, over what will 
count as prior art and bar them from patenting.293 If trade secrecy were 
the rule for publicness, inventors would know more precisely what they 
need to do in order to preserve their rights to patent: keep your 
invention as a trade secret (but don’t commercialize it!294), and if you 
fail to do so, take remedial actions like patenting as soon as possible, 
and at the greatest within one year. 
What would this mean? Formalities such as express confidentiality 
agreements are important in trade secret law, giving courts an easy-to-
apply standard for what constitutes sufficient precautions.295 But they 
don’t rule the day. And nor should they in the patent prior art context. 
For sure, an express confidentiality agreement is preferred to shield 
against a finding of “public use.”296 But, like in Moleculon, discussed 
above, there doesn’t necessarily need to be an express NDA guarding 
                                               
 292. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also supra Part I. 
 293. See, e.g., Jason Ratanen & Madison M. Colon, Can Public Universities Patent Their 
Research?: The Tension Between Open Records Laws and Patentability, (forthcoming 2021) 
(on file with authors). 
 294. This would trigger the Metallizing exception. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon 
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1946). As explained in note 227, 
supra, we do not mean “trade secret” in the sense of deriving economic value. 
 295. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 80–83 (2011). 
 296. See, e.g., Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., No. CV03-2142 GAF (RCx), 2005 WL 
6220720, at *12–13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2005) (patentee defeats allegation of public 
use by demonstrating that any use of the invention by experimenters at company 
required them “to sign strict confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements to 
maintain the trade secret status of the inventions”). 
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the disclosure. In fact, in Moleculon itself, the Federal Circuit expressly 
stated that “the presence or absence of such an agreement is not 
determinative of the public use issue.”297 From the trade secrecy lens, 
this was all the more true given that Nichols was relatively 
unsophisticated, and was dealing only with close friends and 
colleagues, or a trusted company insider.298 In those environs, courts 
should allow trade secret holders much more latitude in utilizing non-
disclosure agreements.299 
The point is that, far from dampening patenting inventors’ 
incentives to invent and patent, the trade secrecy standard streamlines 
them, encouraging inventors to take efficient levels of precaution as they 
prepare to file for patents. Inventors don’t have to embark on maximum 
security—just “reasonable” security.300 In addition, inventors get the 
advantage of a clear rule about when their inventions are going to be 
deemed public and in the prior art. This helps them choose the right 
decision to help them protect their inventions. 
2. Third-party prior art 
The more difficult scenario is where the prior art is generated by a 
third-party over which the inventor has no control. Under a trade 
secret standard, third parties’ non-trade secret disclosures, including 
even a “private” laboratory use like that in Baxter or a tricky-to-locate 
thesis like that in In re Hall, can enter the prior art and ruin a later 
inventor’s chance to patent. 
The rule is indeed harsher here. To state the obvious, inventors cannot 
save themselves from third-party disclosures by taking “reasonable 
measures” to protect their inventions. And they can’t necessarily patent 
within one year of these disclosures since they may not know about them. 
To give one extreme example, in Evans Cooling Systems, Inc. v. General 
Motors Corp.,301 the Federal Circuit held that the invention (relating to 
a car motor) entered the prior art due to a third party’s (General 
                                               
 297. Moleculon Rsch. Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]he presence or absence of such an agreement is not determinative of the public 
use issue. It is one factor to be considered in assessing all the evidence.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 298. Id. at 1265–66. 
 299. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 725–
26 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiffs undertook reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy 
of toy prototype despite failing to secure a written confidentiality agreement). 
 300. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 301. 125 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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Motors) sale of cars containing the invention more than a year before 
the inventor filed his patent—even though General Motors itself had 
misappropriated the inventor’s trade secret.302 The inventor’s (John 
Evans) careful use of his invention as a trade secret did not protect his 
ability to patent at a later date because the third party took it and sold 
it, quite publicly, in violation of the on sale bar. The court held that 
Evans could not patent his pilfered invention.303 GM’s usage created 
prior art under Section 102, leaving the inventor without a patent. 
So perhaps inventors like Mr. Evans will make fewer investments in 
inventing and patenting, when confronted with the uncontrollable risk 
that third-party prior art will bar them. However, this does not seem 
likely. As an initial matter, despite the harsh consequence for inventors 
like Evans, it seems clear that the nonremoval principle should triumph 
in this case. GM had placed the invention into the public domain by 
selling it on the open market in GM cars, free for others to use and 
reverse engineer.304 It would be unfair to take this information back. 
Moreover, concerns about inventor incentives in these third-party 
prior art cases are somewhat illusory. One cannot realistically be 
concerned that people would not bother to derive inventions in light 
of the risk of barring third-party party disclosures. Just look at what 
usually happens in these third-prior art cases—someone else did invent 
them.305 Baxter and In re Hall are perfect examples of where the patent 
system does not need to reward a later inventor for re-inventing 
something that already exists in the prior art.306 In those cases, it would 
be better to encourage inventors to find these preexisting inventions 
                                               
 302. Id. at 1452; see also id. at 1450 (noting that “GM and its independent dealers 
had placed the patented invention on sale prior to the critical date with the 
introduction of its 1992 Corvette”). 
 303. Id. at 1454. 
 304. See Action Learning Sys., Inc. v. Crowe, No. CV-14-5112-GW(SHx), 2014 WL 
12564011, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (“Matters which are completely disclosed by 
the goods which one markets cannot be his secret.” (quotations omitted)). 
 305. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736–37 (2012). 
 306. The commercialization incentive problem is somewhat more plausible. The 
mere existence of the enabling doctoral thesis in In re Hall, for instance, does not 
indicate the invention had been brought to market. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). However, the grant of a patent hardly guarantees commercial success. 
See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343–44 (2010) 
(arguing patent law does not create sufficient incentives to actually commercialize). 
So it seems foolhardy to change the rule on this basis alone, giving patents for 
inventions that might already be known to people in the field on the hope that this 
will launch them to market. 
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by searching the prior art. Why risk violating the nonremoval principle 
simply for the sake of “reinventing the wheel”?307 
For sure, a case like Evans is trickier, because the third party derived 
the prior art from the inventor. But even in these derivation cases, the 
first inventors still have other remedies. First, if derivation rises to the 
level of misappropriation of the inventor’s trade secret, the inventor 
would have a trade secret claim against the third party.308 Second, if the 
third party goes on to try to get its own patent, the inventor could argue 
the invention was improperly derived from another and thus not 
suitable for a patent under various provisions of the Patent Act.309 
Patent law’s disclosure policy raises additional concerns, at least in 
some prior art cases. Obviously, if the barring third-party prior art is a 
U.S. patent or a traditional scientific publication, there is no additional 
incentive to disclose required, assuming the information is sufficiently 
enabling.310 But as we’ve seen, there are harder cases like Baxter (use 
within a lab) and Shimadzu (use within a firm), where even if the 
disclosure is technically enabling, because a hypothetical PHOSITA 
watching the use could discern how to make and use the invention, it 
does not disclose the information to a meaningful number of people 
in a widely accessible forum. If others can’t thereafter get a patent for 
                                               
 307. On the economics of prior art searching, see MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 25, 
at 427–30; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 289, at 303. 
 308. See Evans Cooling Sys., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1454 (“Evans is not without recourse if 
GM in fact misappropriated his invention. Evans would have an appropriate remedy 
in state court for misappropriation of a trade secret.”). 
 309. Pre-AIA, the Patent Act included a specific prohibition on patenting 
something the purported inventor did not actually invent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006). 
Post-AIA, there are various options, including a derivation proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 135 
(2018); see also Dennis Crouch, With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 
U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but Not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, 
PATENTLY-O (Oct. 4 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-
eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html. 
 310. For “patented” and traditional printed publication prior art, the disclosure 
probably would be enabling. After all, “[t]he § 112 requirement that patented 
inventions be reproducible by a PHOSITA without undue experimentation [is] similar 
to the standards of scientific publication.” Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose 
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 553–54 (2012); see also Sean B. 
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 628 (2010) 
(noting how science publications can have superior disclosures to patents). But see 
Seymore, supra note 1, at 925, 932–33 (noting that to meet the “anticipatory 
enablement” standard, a prior art reference need not actually fully teach the invention 
and that in some fields effectively “nonenabling” prior art can bar future patents). 
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the invention, this could limit incentives for anyone to ever disclose 
the invention to a critical mass of people. 
On the other hand, even in cases like Baxter, vigilant, forward-
thinking inventors can still patent these inventions, notwithstanding 
the risk of preempting third-party prior art. They just have to do so 
quickly, before the third-party prior art comes out. In this sense, the 
harsh aspect of the trade secrecy standard simply heightens one of 
Section 102’s key functions: to encourage “prompt filing” of patents 
and “prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions [to the 
public].”311 It also aligns with the AIA’s goals in transitioning to a first-
to-file regime. Recall that under the AIA’s first-to-file rule, inventors 
must strive to patent as quickly as possible in order to achieve 
priority.312 So treating third-party non-trade secret disclosures as prior 
art supports this goal, because it enhances the need to file promptly. 
In sum, the trade secrecy standard performs an essential role in 
protecting the public’s access to inventions that have become available 
to the public, and simultaneously supports and streamlines inventor’s 
incentives. 
3. The third-party problem 
As we alluded to in Part III, there is one significant set of cases where 
the courts may be getting it wrong: cases where a third party (not the 
inventor) is employing the invention as a trade secret, but where the 
courts nonetheless hold this enters the prior art. This situation is 
usually going to arise only for a process invention or something that is 
possible to keep secret while benefitting from it commercially, like 
software or a machine for making consumer products. Courts sometimes 
classify this as prior art, even though it is done in secret.313 
An extreme example is Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.314 American 
Airlines was using its internally developed “SABRE” reservation system 
in secret for many years prior to the patentee (Lockwood’s) filing 
date.315 The Federal Circuit held American Airlines’ use constituted a 
                                               
 311. See, e.g., Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (applying 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Lab’ys, Inc., 88 F.3d 
1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing a policy of Section 102(b) as including 
“favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions”); see also supra Part I. 
 312. Alternatively, they can perform a saving disclosure within one year before 
filing. Merges, supra note 59, at 1025, 1038; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 313. See supra Section III.C. 
 314. 107 F.3d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 315. Id. at 1570. 
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“public use” of the reservation system and rendered the invention 
“known or used by others” within the meaning of Section 102—even 
though the system was not placed on sale and the airline was 
apparently deliberately keeping the system as a trade secret.316 
This case contradicts a lot of the case law we discussed in Part III, 
like Rosaire and Shimadzu, where prior use or knowledge was prior art 
only because users failed to keep the invention sufficiently secret. Why 
should an airline’s trade secret usage enter the prior art against 
another’s later attempt to patent? There is no public reliance problem. 
There is no Metallizing inventor commercialization problem. It is also 
not even possible to say, as it is for third-party secret “on sale” activity, 
that “Congress said so.”317 
There is one obvious justification for holding that American 
Airlines’ prior trade secret usage of the reservation system in Lockwood 
was prior art. This was simply the fact that American Airlines was 
getting sued for using a process that it itself had invented, and that it 
was using long before the inventor got a patent on it.318 It wouldn’t 
have seemed fair to let the company get sued for what they’d already 
been using for such a lengthy period. What’s more, it appears there 
were many other airlines using the reservation system besides 
American Airlines—and they might have been about to get sued too.319 
Put differently, there actually was a serious reliance problem, even 
though the invention hadn’t entered the public domain, because it was 
still a trade secret. Thus, the court had to invalidate the patent. 
The concerns motivating Lockwood have to some degree been solved 
by the amendments in the AIA. In the AIA, we moved to a first-to-file 
system, so the fact that American Airlines invented first should not 
matter as much as it might have under the old first-to-invent system.320 
                                               
 316. American Airline’s own expert conceded “that the essential algorithms of the 
SABRE software were proprietary and confidential.” Id. 
 317. Cf. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 634 
(2019) (holding inventor’s secret on sale activity prior art given that “Congress did not 
alter the meaning of ‘on sale’ when it enacted the AIA”). 
 318. Another possible justification is that the public was already getting the benefit 
of the invention. But this is an outlier view for how to judge public availability. Cf. Burk 
& Lemley, supra note 155, at 379–80. 
 319. Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1570. 
 320. See Abrams & Wagner, supra note 49, at 520 (discussing the shift away from 
first-to-invent rule). 
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Relatedly, Congress has added a limited “prior user defense” precisely 
to protect the interests of prior inventors like American Airlines.321 
Although the prior user defense could (and arguably should) be 
much stronger than it is, the defense makes clear that at least some 
trade secret uses by third parties other than the inventor will not be 
deemed infringing.322 This in turn indicates that those uses are not in 
the prior art, for there would be no purpose for a prior user defense if 
a third party’s prior use counted as invalidating prior art against the 
patent being enforced.323 Especially now that we have a prior user 
defense, trade secret uses by third parties, other than the inventor, 
should not count as prior art.324 
C. Fleshing Out “Otherwise Available to the Public” 
A final benefit of the trade secrecy standard is to clarify what the 
phrase “available to the public” means in the AIA. As explained in Part 
I, in 2011 Congress added a new phrase to Section 102, indicating that 
prior art now includes anything that renders the claimed invention 
“otherwise available to the public.”325 This textual addition has led to 
considerable uncertainty and debate.326 Some commentators initially 
                                               
 321. Section 273 of the Patent Act provides a limited defense from patent 
infringement for prior users. However, section 273 only applies for process patents (or 
a patent for a machine used in a process), and the defendant must have “acting in 
good faith, commercially used the subject matter in the United States” either one year 
before the patent filing date or one year before a saving disclosure under § 102(b). 35 
U.S.C. §  273; see also, e.g., Edward D. Manzo, The Impact of the America Invents Act on 
Trade Secrets, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 497, 502 n.18, 518 (2014). 
 322. Anthony A. Hartmann, The New Prior-User-Rights Defense: What Trade Secret 
Holders Need to Consider, NAT’L L.J. (2012) (noting that “while the scope of prior-user-
right defense has certainly been expanded” under the AIA, there remain “many 
uncertainties and risks” associated with raising the defense). 
 323. For similar arguments, see, for example, Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative 
History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 435, 451–64 (2012); 
Jeffrey P. Duke, The First Inventors Defense Act (35 U.S.C. § 273): Have Prior User Rights in 
Patent Law Been Resurrected?, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 223, 242 (2001). 
 324. We are less concerned about third-party trade secret sales of the invention. 
These usually will fail the trade secrecy standard anyway. And also Congress has used 
the word “on sale” in the statute. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 
139 S. Ct. 628, 634 (2019); see supra Part III. 
 325. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); see supra Part I. 
 326. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 224, at 422–23; Raja Chatterjee, The Patent On-Sale 
Bar Post-Helsinn and Its Effect on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 CHI. KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
207, 226–27 (2019); see also Caroline A. Schneider, The New Novelty: Defining the Content 
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argued that, post-AIA, references are only invalidating if they meet a 
heightened standard of publicness.327 Even the U.S. Patent Office 
(USPTO) initially adopted this view.328 Others disagreed, arguing that 
the addition of the phrase “otherwise available to the public” merely 
creates a new “catchall” category of prior art without necessarily 
mandating that other categories be more public than before.329 
The trade secrecy standard informs the question of what “available 
to the public” means in two ways. First, courts should take a signal from 
this new catchall and shift to a functional analysis. Rather than focusing 
on fitting activity into statutory categories, they should assess the 
underlying question of publicness. Trade secrecy status should be the 
starting point for a Section 102 analysis. Second, to the extent the 
addition of “otherwise available to the public” indicates there can be 
new forms of prior art not contained in the old categories, trade 
secrecy provides a simple answer to what type of activity might qualify. 
Simply put, it encompasses trade secrecy-destroying disclosures that 
don’t fall into one of the other categories. We give two examples. 
A first example is an unwritten oral disclosure of information about 
an invention (say, on a telephone call or a Zoom meeting) that reaches 
a significant number of people in the field—thereby rendering the 
information generally known—or that is not given under circumstances 
demonstrating reasonable efforts were taken to maintain secrecy. This 
would not technically count as a printed publication or a public use of 
the invention under patent prior art jurisprudence, but it would render 
information no longer a trade secret and, therefore, legally available to 
the public. 
A second example of a new form of non-trade secret, “available to 
the public,” prior art is where numerous companies use a process 
invention in secret such that it becomes general knowledge in the 
industry. In this case, there may not even be a singular disclosure that 
can be identified, but the invention becomes known to enough people 
in the industry that it no longer would qualify as any one company’s 
                                               
of “Otherwise Available to the Public”, 41 J. LEGIS. 151, 161–62 (2014) (assessing whether 
“otherwise available to the public” should be informed by European law). 
 327. See Williams, supra note 224, at 424; see also Brief for Congressman Lamar Smith 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229). 
 328. U.S. Patent Office Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2152.02(d) (2014). 
 329. Lemley, supra note 79, at 1127. 
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trade secret because it has become generally known.330 This 
information might be deemed to enter the prior art under an 
interpretation of “otherwise available to the public” that is informed 
by the trade secrecy standard. Once information about an invention 
becomes “generally known” to people in the relevant industry, or even 
simply “readily ascertainable” to them using “proper means,” it would 
be deemed to have entered the prior art. The information could not 
be taken back through operation of a patent. 
CONCLUSION 
Without saying so, the courts are applying trade secrecy rules in 
patent prior art cases. It is a simple, if currently unstated, rule: if a 
disclosure of information does not qualify as a trade secret, then it will 
be deemed to have entered the prior art; if a disclosure does qualify as 
a trade secret, then it will not be deemed to have entered the prior art. 
We think the trade secrecy standard for prior art should be 
recognized more explicitly than it currently is. The trade secrecy 
standard for patent prior art helps courts and other decisionmakers 
efficiently and fairly draw the proper line between secret and public 
information. It helps enforce the nonremoval principle by protecting 
members of the relevant public from being deprived of what they have 
already justifiably and lawfully relied upon. And it streamlines 
inventors’ incentives because it makes the path to patenting more 
efficient and clarifies the steps inventors must take to prevent their 
inventions from falling into the prior art. 
                                               
 330. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); cf. Hutchison v. KFC Corp., 51 F.3d 280, 280 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding in a trade secret case that a fried chicken recipe was not a trade secret 
because it was “generally known in the industry”). 
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